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Research at the Core - Toufic Hakim

Director: Office of Research and Sponsored Programs

The Office of Research & Sponsored Programs is pleased to publish the second e-book on the theme of Empire and Cultural Conquest. The essays therein represent research by students and faculty on a multi-faceted, cross-disciplinary theme, whose implications are complex, and perhaps timeless.

Ever since its genesis in Athens, through its tender years in Western Europe and its evolution in the States through Harvard College in 1636, the university has been a free marketplace of ideas where teacher-scholars, student-scholars and ideas interact. But over the past four centuries, higher education institutions where studies of empire and culture can be freely explored, have themselves become figuratively empires, in which political power struggles thrive, cultures and subcultures clash, dollars speak, armies of rules and regulations are in control. One would hope that, at the end of the day, the power of the idea and the passion for examining, discovering, debating and writing will prevail and remain the main activity that sustains these empires. One must wonder.

The fact is: The mission of higher education has changed over the years, from one that focused early on teaching and learning for learning sake (training learned clergy) to one of service (building infrastructure and agriculture in the late 1800’s) to one of basic research as Hopkins borrowed academic freedom and the professoriate system from the German model to on of applied research after World War II. Today, in our post-post-modern world, maybe in this neoconservative environment, we see all mission varieties, with one common feature: a powerful tension between a culture of research and a culture of teaching in almost every setting.

This tension has boiled over during the last decade in particular under the weight of increased and persistent public scrutiny, exploding costs and sticker prices, pressing and twisted calls for accountability, open attacks on tenure and esoteric research. And we have all been caught in this tidal wave of reform and reengineering creating a big valley
between the hill of teaching and the hill of research. At comprehensive institutions, we seem to lean toward the teaching bias. At the center of this bias is a major misconception, that research and teaching are separate and unequal. One serves the students more than the other, some believe. Yes, preparing students effectively to be lifelong learners and contributing professionals is paramount. The question is not whether the mission at our comprehensive institutions is student-centered, but rather how.

Should we not adopt a philosophy that research and teaching are two faces of the same book cover, framing together the university experience? Students must be engaged in research to really understand and connect what is being taught. Researchers must be engaged in teaching to really disseminate and refine what is being researched. And the two groups shall ideally work together toward exploring and transmitting new knowledge and ultimately seeking skills and wisdom to better society and satisfy our hungry minds.

Our challenge is not only to build discrete bridges and connections between the two, but more so to fill the valley so that we can unite the two activities and make them a more meaningful continuum. The two should be elements of an integrated workload; combined and essential activities in coursework and curricula; true driving engines in decision making and strategic planning; feeding into each other.

How else can we otherwise fulfill Gibran’s interpretation of teaching as “not bidding the students to enter our temple of wisdom but leading them to the threshold of their own minds”?

Within the context of today’s economic and political realities, realities of empires dressed as republics, we must work diligently to maintain the core value of a university. Change should be measured against what remains constant, so it is our obligation to protect and defend what must remain constant: free inquiry. Student-faculty research speaks to this core value, to the connection between teaching and research. This is why the Office of Research & Sponsored Programs will continue to provide student and faculty researchers with the moral and grant support needed to move to the next level.
Cultural anthropologist Margaret Meade said it well: “Never doubt that a few committed teacher-scholars and student-scholars can transform a university, indeed, nothing else ever had.”
Introduction to Empire and Cultural Conquests - Dennis B. Klein

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This second volume of the online Comparative Cultures Journal, published by Kean University with support from its Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, continues the university’s Faculty Seminar on Comparative Cultures’s investigation of topical problems in multidisciplinary contexts. Like the first volume, it is a collaboration of faculty and students. Students were invited to participate in seminar faculty research interests as part of their course work, giving them opportunities to appreciate the potentially extended shelf-life of exceptional scholarly endeavor. Seminar members selected the best student submissions for campus-wide panel presentations and for this book.

The Faculty Seminar is, itself, a noteworthy enterprise. Founded in 1999 to give faculty, who are otherwise devoted to Kean’s demanding teaching schedule, the chance to develop and share their research in progress. By defining a theme each year (two years for the empire theme), self-selected faculty members seek not only to promote a spirit of hard-earned collegiality springing from a common thematic concern, but also to acquire perspectives from as many diverse disciplinary fields as possible. The results, summed up in the Faculty Seminar profile at the end of this volume, has been gratifying as well as truly extraordinary.

Empire is, of course, a topic of considerable debate and consternation among scholars and the general public alike. Like the theme of our first volume, “Violence and the State,” it defines coordinates on the map of our present, troubled world. Surely the much-discussed “clash of civilizations” suggests a resurgence of empire-building that, historically, the birth and prominence of sovereign modern nation-states were in part
supposed to mute and that, more recently, the defeat of the Third Reich was thought to have finally discredited. But the documented emergence of imperialism in the 19th century partly from nationalist movements, including German nationalism (the subject of students’ papers in this volume) reminds us that the current quest for empire results from modern nationalist expression as much as it does from premodern religious enthusiasm and postmodern global commitments.

I am grateful to the seminar’s members for their creative research and for sharing it with their colleagues and students. I wish expressly to acknowledge two members for their leadership—Dr. Barbara Wheeler, director of the Africana Studies program at Kean and Professor of Anthropology who is my founding co-chair, and Dr. Sue Ellen Gronewold, Assistant Professor of History who organized the twin faculty and student roundtable panels and edited this volume. I am also grateful to Toufic Hakim, director of the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, who provided support for launching this series of electronic Faculty Seminar volumes.

Let me invite you, the reader, to make the most of this electronic version of these important papers by submitting your own work on the empire or the violence/state theme for our publishing consideration.
The Pride of a Nation - Jeremy Bahun

“Germany does not look to Prussia’s liberalism, but to her power. The south German States-Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden-would like to indulge in liberalism, and because of that no one will assign Prussia’s role to them. Prussia must collect her forces and hold them in reserve for an opportune moment.” (Bismarck)

The author of that statement, Otto von Bismarck, is one of the main figures in the history of Germany, Europe and the world. It was his resilience that led to the several separate German states left sovereign after the First Reich of the Holy Roman Empire to unify and create the Second Reich, one Germany. His statement above describes his home area’s (Prussia’s) role in this unification. He describes that the other states want what Prussia has, power and influence. That idea of power and of a German Empire are the two main themes during this Second Reich, and would pave the way for Hitler’s destructive Third Reich less than a century later.

The main concern for Bismarck and for the German people was the State. Simply defined, a State is not what we think of in America. A State is a sovereign principality, governed within itself, without outside interference. The modern country is a state in the world. So for Bismarck and the German people the main concern was for Germany herself, and not necessarily for the people who resided in her. “The State is not an Academy of Arts. If it neglects its strength in order to promote the idealistic aspirations of man, it repudiates its own nature and perishes” (Treitschke, 353). The State is merely concerned with prosperity and survival, and as we can see with this quote here it can not achieve those goals by resting on its laurels.

While the State may necessarily endorse humanism, it does rely very heavily on the people that live inside of it. After all a State is not much more than a collection of people living by the same law. “...Ideas by themselves do not move political forces. If they are to influence public life effectively they must find support in the vital economic interests of
the people” (Treitschke, 353). The State uses its citizens in order to promote its own welfare, however the most basic function of a State is to serve its people. While emphasis is put on emphasis on the people. However, that emphasis is only on the people who are members of the majority, that group with the ability to keep or oust those in power.

Those in power, in every chapter of history from the first civilizations to the United States, want to stay where they are. “State cannot legitimately tolerate any power above its own...” (Treitschke, 353). The State has the final say on everything, no one is above the State, and as we see here the State may be a group, or even a single person: “The State is born in a community whenever a group or an individual has achieved sovereignty by imposing its will upon the whole body...” (Treitschke, 353). The State is nothing more than a person, or a group building their own empire from those they call their neighbors. Bismarck then was the State when he unified Germany in 1871, and he achieved his sovereignty when he took control over the sovereignty of others. As I mentioned before those in power like to stay where they are, and they like to expand on what they already have. That is where the want to build an empire out of your borders comes from.

How though can a State increase its power by gaining control of its neighbor’s sovereignty? Through arms is the answer since no State will voluntarily give up its freedom. “An unarmed State, incapable of drawing the sword when it sees fit, is subject to one which wields the power of declaring war” (Treitschke, 354). This has proven to be true in history as we have seen in the nations of Europe enforcing their will on the native-peoples across the world. It was not that the natives were not armed, but they might as well have not been when they were using wood against cold, hard steel.

One conflict that was undertaken by Germany in its quest of Empire was the First World War, in which it fought on the basis of its treaties with its neighbors. Heinrich von Treitschke sees a problem with treaties due to the nature of the State: “No State can pledge its future to another. It knows no arbiter, and draws up all its treaties with this implied reservation” (Treitschke, 354). With that Germany did not have to enter the war
and escalate it to global standards when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Germany most likely wanted to take part in order to build up its own power, and to build its Empire.

Unfortunately for those who were fighting in this era of treaties, in this “war to end all wars” the glory of the state was the opposite of what happened to Germany. Firstly the soldiers of the war did not get anything they expected. “Our spirits were excellent, though we were going to be put in where the battle of the Somme was as its worst” (Junger, no page). Here is an account of a soldier who knew what he was sent into, and yet his mood is as good as can be. This is the sense of nationalism that makes a State so powerful, and I am sure that the leaders of the State were not taking up arms in the battle. After the battle though our soldier, Ernst Junger, described the hell that is war. “Every hand’s breadth of ground had been churned up again and again; trees had been uprooted, smashed, and ground to touchwood, the houses blown to bits and turned to dust; hills had been leveled and the arable land made a desert” (Junger, no page). This hell that he lived through was for the “Glory of the State”, nothing more.

Rosa Luxemburg believed that the war was fought for the conquest of another faction within Germany’s own borders. “Historically, this war was ordained to thrust forward the cause of the proletariat...It was ordained to drive the German proletariat to the pinnacle of the nation and thereby begin to organize the international and universal conflict between capital and labor for political power within the state” (Luxemburg, 5). The war was nothing more than a ploy in order to bring another group into power over its neighbors. United States history has seen this many times before, in the Presidents of wars. Do you think George Washington would be as popular if he did not led America in the Revolution, or would Lincoln if he did not fight the Civil War to keep the Union together? Even Roosevelt, one of the hardest working, most popular Presidents of all time was not that popular until his reaction to Pearl Harbor. This is one reason that wars are fought, so the people leading them can stay on the pedestal they are on.
Unfortunately for Germany, they received the exact opposite result they had sought. The result was the Treaty of Versailles, which to say the least was anti-German. “Article 231. The Allied and Associated Government affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Government and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies” (Treaty of Versailles). In a couple of lines of text, everything that the people of Germany hold in high regard was shattered. The people fought for the glory of the State, for the empire. And now this very proud, nationalistic State must get on its knees and beg for forgiveness. This created a sense of defeat, to say the least.

This defeat would open the door to anyone who could rally up the spirit of the State again, and the Treaty of Versailles would lead (almost directly) to the Third Reich. One thing the Third Reich did in its vision of empire was prey on those who did not put the State first. From long before Hitler those people were the Jews, and “Native Germans” always had a distaste for this particular group. Richard Wagner in 1850, almost a century before the Holocaust published “Judaism in Music” which explained some of the sentiments towards those of Jewish background. “But if emancipation from the yoke of Judaism appears to us the greatest of necessities, we must hold it weighty above all to prove our forces for this war of liberation” (Wagner, no page). Right there, one sentence, describes the overall German view of those who live in the borders of Germany, but instead of looking to a cross look to a star. This sentiment would be huge later on in history as the Third Reich comes along, but here in this context it means more for the Glory of the State.

We have seen that the State in Germany, while it may be viewed as pure by its constituents, has led them into trouble. It was mentioned before that the State is formed when one person or group realized sovereignty by taking it away from others. That basically means that those who fight for the “State” fight for others control over them. The main goal of those in power is to increase their power and stay where they are, and that is abundant here. When Bismarck rose to power he increased it by unifying the
German States into THE German State. Germany looked to increase its empire with World War I but instead saw its State reduced to groveling. These events would eventually lead to Hitler’s rise to power through the new sense of nationalism and the Third Reich.
Empire building emerged as a central theme in the period spanning between 1870-1930, and although this concept was envisioned differently by different individuals, it was consistently expressed through images of blood, use of power, dominance and force, and masculine images. This “yearning for empire” (Klein, pg. 2 syllabus), expressed in similar terms emanated across abroad range of German notables including the writer Thomas Mann; German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck; the soldier Ernst Junger; the socialist movement leader Rosa Luxumburg; and with Adolph Hitler, the military dictator and Fuhrer. A strong vein of recurrent violent images regarding the notion of empire, born out of the frustration of the German people, can be demonstrated through an examination of the writing of such notables in relation to the events that occurred during the corresponding period in German history.

On January 18, 1871, The Second German Empire, or Second Reich was formed in Versailles, combining the loosely bounded federation of states, with William I of Prussia proclaimed Emperor or Kaiser. This national crowning event was largely brought about through the efforts of Otto von Bismarck, named Prime Minister by King William I of Prussia. Bismarck’s belief in the use of aggression and power to achieve an end is evident in his speech to the Reistag on September 30, 1862. “Not by speeches and majorities will the great question of the day be decided – that was the mistake of 1848-1849 – but by iron and blood.” (Bismarck, pg. 1) He was intent on creating a machstaat, or power state, through the reinforcement of Prussia military might. Bismarck demonstrated his beliefs in the principals of force, military might and war while utilizing his skills as a pragmatic diplomat to facilitate the execution of his policies of realpolitit during his term as chancellor.

Otto von Bismarck was driven by a nationalist dream and visions of a united German Empire. “For unification to succeed, two things were necessary, an international crisis that made it impossible for the great powers to intercede, a Prussian leadership capable of recognizing the opportunity and seizing it.” (Schultze, pg. 152) Bismarck was to be that
leader and he was well aware that Prussia could not be viewed as the aggressor in any hostilities. Conscious of Napoleon II’s, the French Emperor, aggressive tendencies, Bismarck baited him into declaring war on July 19, 1870. After victory in a series of great battles, Germany emerged victorious and the Peace Treaty of Frankfort was signed on May 10, 1871.

“Political unification of the German states proceed in tandem with the events of war.” The fever pitch of patriotism in both public and press placed such pressure on the southern German governments that their cabinets could see no viable path other than joining the North German Confederation, on whatever terms might be offered. German unification by no means came about solely on orders from above, from the ruling princes and their governments, but also as the result of clamor from below, from the forces of the liberal, middle class national movement, and the result was accordingly not a Great Prussia but as German Empire. (Schultze, pg. 144-145) Otto von Bismarck did not stand alone in his nationalistic desires and visions of a united German Empire. The people, through Bismarck, had achieved their goal with real military might advancing the German people to the rightful place in the world scene.

This vision of an unyielding empire created and maintained through aggression and force was also expressed by the German historian Heinrick von Treitschke in “Politics”, written during this period in German history. His underlying premise is that no great nation can exist without placing its interests above all other, whether in the case of internal or external threats, and this inherent right of the state must be enforced through the use of force and aggression. “This pregnant theory of independence implies firstly so absolute a moral supremacy that the State can not legitimately tolerate a power above its own, and secondly a temporal freedom entailing a variety of material resources adequate to its protection against hostile influences.” (Treischke, pg. 353)

Treischke explained that not only strength through military means is essential but also asserted that it is necessary for the State to reign supreme over all aspects of the community it reigns over. “The nation is not entirely comprised of the State, but the
State protects and embraces the people’s life, regulating its external aspects on every side. It does not ask primarily for opinion, but demands obedience, and its laws must be obeyed, whether willing or no.” (Treischke, pg. 353) His text embodied the nature of the State rife with aggression and expressions of superiority, and governed with threats and violence not only towards its outward adversaries but also toward its own people.

Political, societal, and economic conflicts beset the development following the unification of Germany. The nation became increasingly industrialized, making the distance between the classes more distinct, with political power still firmly in the hands of the landowning aristocracy. Various political parties were formed with intersecting and varying social and economic concerns, competed for power in a government, bicameral in nature, but in reality a Nationalist Authoritarian Monarchy. Although the empire had been reconstituted through inflamed national sentiments and military conflict, the country was still gripped in a state of war like tensions, splintering into diverse, sectional factions. "‘Problems relating to minority groups had arisen with the founding of a German National State.’” (Schultze, pg. 160) "‘Internal consolidation’ of the empire, the achievement of some kind of balance between the various groups making up the nation, was the most pressing problem of domestic politics.” (Schultze, pg. 160) The tension, struggle and desire for dominance within the newly formed empire created not only political and social turmoil but a sense of uncertainty and doubt that the country could ever be truly united.

When news of the onset of what was to become WWI reached Germany in 1914, it was received with a sense of excitement, anticipation, and relief. The hostilities were seen as something vital, necessary and desirable, offering a heighten state of human existence. “Celebrated in the propaganda output as the ’spirit of 1914’, it was not unlike the demonstrations of mass enthusiasm in London, Paris and St. Petersburg. In German political tradition, parties were symbols of narrow special interests, political infighting, and threats to national unity. Now with the outbreak of hostilities, the parties lined up behind the government.” (Schultze, pg. 191)
The writing during this period reflected a sense that violent action and aggression were welcome components in this culture of warfare. In Ernst Junger's book written in 1919, he not only recounted his experiences as a storm troop officer on the front line during WWI, but also reflected on the general atmosphere of aggression that had settled around Germany. War was an event that was desired and longed for. “We knew that we were on the verge this time of a battle such as the world has never seen. Soon our excited talk rose to a pitch that would have rejoiced the heart of any freebooters, or of Frederick’s Grenadiers.” (Junger, pg. 1) Regardless of whether in the throws of an actual battle, Junger acknowledged that the heightened atmosphere of aggression and a war like state was ingrained into the society. “A battle was no longer an episode that spent itself in blood and fire; it was a condition of things that dug itself in remorselessly week after week and even month after month.” (Junger, pg. 4) He expressed the instinctive knowledge that the violence and aggression he witnessed during the war were to become ingrained in both the combatant and non-combatants long after the official hostilities ceased.

In Rosa Luxemburg’s pamphlet, “The War and the Workers”, she also described the future empire of Germany defined in warlike, aggressive and bloody terms. Her visions of a socialist (or communist) state, not only within Germany, but also internationally, represented a different vision of empire for Germany. “Historically, this war was ordained to thrust forward the cause of the proletariat… It was ordained to drive the German proletariat to the pinnacle of the nation and thereby begin to organize the international and universal conflict between capital and labor for political power within the state.” (Luxemberg, pg. 5) She saw this vision thwarted by the shift of consciousness of the Social Democratic Party away from socialist cause, the proletariat was ripped from the ranks of the cause into the service of the German imperialists, only to be ravaged by warfare.

Although she condemned the actions of the capitalist governments for the savagery of the warfare, she herself advocated a violent and bloody ‘war within a war’, to achieve her organizations goal. “The victory of socialism will not descend from heaven. It can only
be won by a long chain of violent tests of strength between the old and the new powers.” (Luxemberg, pg. 9) Her views are expressed in the terms of a masculine, bloody struggle that was often utilized in the writing of that period.

As the hostilities dragged on for years, rather than the few weeks as most had originally anticipated, enthusiasm for the war dampened. But even after the conclusion of the war, the tensions within Germany were not alleviated, but may have been compounded by the very treaty that was to end hostilities. The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919 in the Hall of Mirrors. Although this site had previously been associated with the crowning moment of German unification and founding of the second German Empire on January 18, 1871, brought about through nationalistic and patriotic fervor, this meeting in Versailles would come to represent one of the lowest points in German national ambitions. This treaty marked the end of hostilities on the battlefield with the defeat of Germany by the Allied Powers, but it also demonstrated that this defeat alone would not satisfy the victors, but they were intent on the utter humiliation of Germany. This dictat restricted the nations greatest sources of pride and power, the military, required Germany to accept all responsibility for the war itself, and inflicted financial harm through the imposition of war reparations. The territories ceded to Germany following the Franco-Prussian War, namely Alsace and Lorraine were restored to France, thus disrupted the unity achieved in 1871. This treaty would generate feelings of resentment and hostility within Germany that would fester and foster aggressive behavior for years to come.

After the conclusion of WWI, the coalition government of Weimar Republic, the proclamation of it’s constitution complete on August 14, 1919, emerged in Germany, which converted the previous authoritarian monarchy to a parliamentary government. The Weimar Republic although experiencing a small amount of stability during the second half of 1919, was constantly being challenged by both the left and the right and suffered a swift succession of different governments. The weight of the reparations, other restrictions placed on the government by the Treaty of Versailles and the underlying structure of the government made the system extremely difficult or impossible to operate.

The coalition government consisted of the central government, consisting of three parties, The Socialist Democratic Party (SPD), The Center Party or middle class party, and the German Democratic Party (DDP) which was the minority party. There were other right wing parties that were outside the central government that tried to negotiate their differences within the system and finally the extreme parties that did not attempt to work within the current system but were in total opposition to it. “This was the soil in which Hitler’s totalitarian and aggressive regime was ultimately able to grow.” (Shultze, pg. 205) Hitler was involved in the formation of the NSDAP (Nazi Party), one of the extreme parties working outside the system, and quickly rose to become its leader in 1920.

Hitler’s “Mein Kampf”, written while imprisoned after a failed putsch, is an excellent example of a particular notion of empire and a step by step outline on how to achieve such an empire. “This model of community…seemed to promise a solution to the class tension of modern industrial societies. The racist anti-Semitic doctrine served as a vehicle for an aggressive sense of Germans’ missionary role in world politics, a hyperbolic distortion of the old dream of a Great German Empire in the heart of Europe.” (Schultze, pg. 231) Although his writings are not bloody descriptions of action, his language expressed an unyielding aggressiveness and a unwavering need to assert total dominance over the German people. “This principal – absolute responsibility unconditionally combined with absolute authority – will gradually breed an elite of leaders such as today, in this era of irresponsible parliamentarianism, is utterly inconceivable.” (Hilter, pg. 450) His regime, although a unifying force in the Third Empire of Germany, would come to be responsible for one of the bloodiest periods in German national history.

The idea of empire predominated and constantly emerged in the period covering 1870 to 1930 and is accompanied with images of blood, warfare, strength, dominance and aggression. The preoccupation with the subject of empire was largely due to the fact that Germany always came close to achieving that ideal but could never actually accomplish it in reality. Even when the Empire became a physical reality in 1919, the disunity and
turmoil within the country did not reflect that ideal. An innate belief within German society, which was reflected in the writing of the period, was that it would someday be achieved through the use of brute force, warfare and bloodshed.
Since the collapse of the Roman Empire, the German states were constantly infatuated with the concept of creating a unified German empire. To completely understand the manner in which the German person felt about power and empires, one has to look back and understand the essential roots of German history.

The first Reich essentially opened the eyes of the Germanic tribes and proved just how capable they were of creating a distinguished empire. These crucial first steps taken by the Germanic tribes to create a united Germany demonstrated to leaders that would later emerge in German history just how significant an empire could become. Leaders like Otto von Bismarck and Adolf Hitler understood the importance of a physically powerful, united Germany and understood that there were certain procedures needed to be taken in order to achieve it. From the sixty years between eighteen seventy and ninety thirty the German leaders strived to create the perfect Reich and also attempted to understand how to control it, but at the same time use the empire for the good of the German people. These struggles are powerfully exemplified through three particular writings of German leaders. The first intensely powerful writing was crafted by Richard Wagner in a piece labeled *Judaism in Music* where he expressed his views towards the Jewish population of Germany. The second piece was a powerful speech from Otto von Bismarck to the Reichstag entitled *Iron and Blood*. The third was a book written by Adolf Hitler called *Mein Kampf*, in which he evaluated Germany and expressed his views very intensely. Wagner, Bismarck, and Hitler gave ideal answers throughout their writings as to why the German people lust for an empire. (Schulze, A New History)

The German people have a certain quality about them, perhaps pride, but it is a feature that made the coming of a Second Reich inevitable. This desire can be exemplified in the piece written by Richard Wagner entitled *Judaism in Music*. Throughout *Judaism in Music*, Wagner expressed his views on Germany and the threats that terrorize the state in an extremely detailed and offensive manner. Wagner strove for a stronger more united Germany, perhaps even leading to the next two German Empires and through his writing.
sparked what would ultimately be a disgrace in German history. Throughout this piece of literature Wagner attacked the Jewish population of Germany stating that they are essentially foreign, unfamiliar human beings that may speak German but are in no way shape or form German. In many words, Wagner believed that true Germans are pure and genuine while Jewish people are greedy and contaminated. The true German population is in essence brought together through a connection of true German folk music and culture. This genuine faith is essentially the root of the German culture and is created between people and their communities. Perhaps Wagner uncovered what this connection or perhaps bond truly was: an essential force that inspired the German people to create such immense empires. (Wagner, Judaism in Music)

Otto von Bismarck was appointed Prime Minister of Prussia by King William I in eighteen sixty two, and by eighteen seventy one had united the German states into an empire. Bismarck believed in Realpolitik or “real politics” and fundamentally perused his vision of the German empire through war and diplomacy. Bismarck’s views can be seen and ultimately understood in his speech to the Reichstag in eighteen sixty two Iron and Blood. Again to fully understand what Bismarck is saying in his speech it is necessary to understand the desire for an empire by the German people and also the fear that will accompany it. Essentially the point that Bismarck was trying to express was that problems exist in empires, but the German strength and power has the ability to overcome any problem. Basically he reiterated the point that Prussia had become a supreme force, and at the appropriate moment he would unleash his empire upon Europe and the iron and blood that were poured into creating this German empire will be realized. From eighteen seventy one Bismarck’s German empire grew to an unimaginable size. Iron-works factories and machine companies emerged throughout the country, even the railroad system became the best in the world, and German cities grew into European metropolises. (Snyder, Iron and Blood)

The Weimar Republic was created after the fall of Germany during the first world war in nineteen nineteen. Germany was shifting from a country driven by empire and headed in a new direction with a democratic state. Unfortunately, despite help from other countries
such as the United States, there was still continued discussion amongst certain German activists against the new democratic state. There were a number of attempts to overthrow the Weimar Republic including the Kapp Putsch in nineteen twenty and the Munich Putsch in nineteen twenty three that was lead by Adolf Hitler. Hitler was sentenced to jail for his act of treason against the German state. While in Jail Hitler wrote his passionate book entitled *Mein Kampf*, where he expressed his opinions about Germany in an extremely philosophical and even psychological manner. Hitler’s views can be seen as a form of madness in most aspects, however, there are times in this book that the genius behind the insanity is revealed. For instance, there is a particular passage that indicates Hitler’s desire for an empire created and controlled through the folk state. The passage reads as follows on page four hundred and forty nine, “The folkish state must care for the welfare of its citizens by recognizing in all and everything the importance of the value of personality, thus in all fields preparing the way for the highest measure of productivity performance which grants the individual the highest measure of participation.” What Hitler may be trying to say is that the folkish state needs to care for its own, perhaps even saying that he can take the folk state and manipulate it through production into the empire that it deserves to be. Hitler strived for a German empire and by World War II it was evident that he would stop at nothing to achieve the Third Reich (Hitler, Mein Kampf)

Hitler’s charisma and power of suggestion through words had such a profound control over people that his influence can be seen in other fictional works of the time. Thomas Mann wrote a story in nineteen thirty one entitled *Mario and the Magician*, a story that delivers the reader a character very similar to Hitler himself. Cipolla, a traveling entertainer has such an intoxicating power of suggestion that under his power of spoken word one is unable to control their movements and even thoughts. Cipolla is much like Hitler in the way that essentially resistance is futile. Perhaps Mann understood Hitler and what would become of the German party under the Nazi rule or perhaps Hitler’s personality and vision of a German empire was so strong that it influenced creative writers of the time. (Mann, Death in Venice)
The German people in many ways are extremely influential. The leaders that have shaped Germany’s history have united the country and created a special bond of unity and brotherhood. Although the rise of the sacred German empire has been a break through of advancement throughout the ages, it has sometimes led to unnecessary wars and even crimes against its own people. The German people and their sacred folk state have created an age long thirst of power that may never be completely understood.
German Empire - Walter McGee

All throughout German history, there has been a call for empire. Germany always had the idea of empire building in every one of their ventures from the year 962 on. From the first time that the Catholic Church recognized a German as the emperor and used the military might of said German “empire” to expand its own power, the German power structure always had a taste for expansion.

In the year 962, Otto I was made the first German “emperor” by the Holy Roman Church. In the tenth century, Germany was one of the most powerful states on the European continent because of her alliance with the Church. Each one gained from the other, Germany gaining the role of military power, with the right to expand, the Church gaining a powerful military ally with which to make its own expansions. But as with most alliances that have been made on these grounds throughout history, friction arose when both tried to be more powerful than the other. (Class Notes).

In the year 1056, King Henry IV declared war against the Church. He felt that the Church should be subservient to the King. Of course, the Church felt differently about this, and in turn broke with Germany. The year 1076 brought a call to German bishops to declare their own independence from Rome. This event forced the Pope out of office, and the Church replaced him with a puppet Pope. The Church knew that it could not militarily defeat Germany, for the basis of the Church’s military might came from Germany. Instead it decided to declare war on someone else, and that someone else came in the form of Islam. (Class Notes).

Through this declaration of war on the invaders from the Islamic world, the Church mounted its power and cushioned its existence through the Crusades in 1095. By doing this, it created a cause that was more important than its own defense. Because Islam was an enemy to everyone of the Christian faith, this action brought other allies on its side. This brought much pressure to bear on Germany, because now they were made to look like aggressors, and supporters of enemies of free Christian states. Through this act, the
Church brought about the fall of Germany, and an end to the First Reich of Germany. The year 1122 saw the Church officially negate the German threat to itself. The desire for global power fell apart, and the desire for an empire did the same within Germany when she broke up into smaller states because of the Church. These smaller states, about three hundred in total, all had different kings of less power. Germany remained in this state from the year 1250 through 1871. (Class Notes).

The preceding gave a background for the basic argument of this paper, that Germany, from the beginning, has always been interested in expansion and empire building. She has always had a desire for military might and world power. The Church’s victory over the German threat in 1122, while lasting over 700 years, did not put out of the minds totally of the German people the idea of world domination. As we will see in the unification of Germany by Otto von Bismarck in 1871 and the formation of the Second Reich therein, the idea of conquest was always in the minds of her people. They were just waiting for the right time and for the right person to unify them.

The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) created the power for the Second Reich of Germany. This is so because out of that war, two main German states emerged more powerful than the other 298, Prussia and Austria. Austria shared borders with the Ottoman Empire, and would hence protect the Christian world from the threat of Islam. Prussia was a progressive, forward thinking, modern German state which in the period of the war built a very powerful military. These two states would be the foundation for Bismarck’s Second Reich, and would be the further foundation for the want for expansion amongst their populace.

In 1862, Otto von Bismarck was appointed Prime Minister of Prussia by the then King William I. In a speech he gave to the Reichstag on September 30 of the same year, Bismarck outlined, vaguely, his intentions for the German Empire.

“Germany does not look to Prussia’s liberalism, but to her power…Not by speeches and majorities of the great questions of the day be decided-that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849-but by iron and blood.”(Bismarck, 1)
This quote from Bismarck’s most famous speech shows that Bismarck had a very clear idea as to how things would look in Germany in the coming years. He understood that Germans wanted empire building, they needed to build an empire if they had any chance of surviving as a race. This was the first reference to power in German politics. Even though he never said that liberalism was wrong, everything that he did say was the complete opposite of that ideal. He felt that the monarchy would only get stronger, and for the base of that strength, you needed an empire. What he meant by the statement that Prussia would provide the “iron and blood” to answer these questions of the day was that he felt that Prussia was a good place for the basis of Germany’s military might.

To show the military might of Germany, and to eventually unify Germany as an empire rather than keep 300 independent states, Bismarck conceived three succinct wars. In 1862, Bismarck declared war on Denmark because they were trying to assert their authority over Schleswig. Within weeks Bismarck was victorious, and in return, Prussia acquired Schleswig, and Austria received control of Holstein. The second of these three minor wars was declared by Bismarck on Austria in 1866. Austria and Prussia were allies, but Austria was also their rival for control of German Europe. Bismarck declared Holstein for Prussia. The “war” lasted for seven weeks, and in the end Prussia was victorious and had control of German Europe. She was the sole might behind what would become the second Reich, and in a way, the Second German Empire. Also, liberals were being drawn into Bismarck’s thinking whereby they saw the importance of leadership from above. They were beginning to be drawn into the thinking of empire building, and this was one of Bismarck’s main objectives for these meaningless wars. He showed them the valor of war, the benefits of the monarchy, and the benefits to being an empire. The third war that would end with the unification of the German states, and the emergence of Germany as an empire, was fought in 1871, the Franco-Prussian War. Napoleon III wanted to intervene in the alliance between Prussia and the Spanish Crown. A tie between the two would mean that France was surrounded by the two most powerful enemies. In the end, though, Prussia emerged victorious, and also as the strongest
military power. In just nine years, Bismarck unified Germany after having been separate states for over 700 years. (Class Notes).

Sacred State, Power State

Around the same time that Bismarck was making his overtures towards Germany as an empire, and then, with Germany unified, began to see his ideas take shape, another one of Germany’s great thinkers was speaking about Germany as a state. That thinker was Heinrich von Treitschke. Treitschke thought, as did Bismarck, that the State should have total control, an idea of *machtstaat*. He believed that the State was all powerful, and that the State was sacred to the point that all that should be done, should be for the benefit of the State.

“Further, if we examine our definition of the State as ‘the people legally united as an independent entity,’ we find that it can be more briefly put thus, ‘The State is the public force for Offence and Defense.’” (Heinrich von Treitschke, 1).

The above statement makes the case that he thought that the State was the sole source of power for the empire. The people would be responsible to the State, and the State to the people. “It is, above all, Power which makes its will prevail, it is not the totality of the people as Hegel assumes in his deification of it.” (Treitschke, 1). Here as well he was setting for the State the source of its will being that of power, absolute and necessary. The will of the masses would come second to the State. He was also making the case for an empire. He defined the State as the unification of the masses of the people, and after unification, the State becomes the public force for “Offence and Defense.” He then ties all of this into the fact that although the State is both of the aforementioned things, it is also the basis of power. Power and the State go hand in hand, and will hence bring forth a victorious people.

Treitschke also felt that the State had a “sacred” appeal to it. When he stated,

“The State is not an Academy of Arts. If it neglects its strength in order to promote the idealistic aspirations of man, it repudiates its own nature and
perishes. This is in truth for the State equivalent to the sin against the Holy Ghost. For it is indeed a moral error in the State to subordinate itself to for sentimental reasons to a foreign Power, as we Germans have often done to England.” (Treitschke, 1).

He was equating the responsibility of the State, a responsibility which he feels is that of Power above all else, with being a moral and religious necessity. He felt that an affront of this responsibility by the State would be to make a cardinal sin. To Treitschke, the State was now “sacred.”

*German Spiritual Superiority*

Besides having a desire for empire, power, *Machtstaat*, and moral order, the Germans also felt that they had spiritual superiority. In speaking of war propaganda, Hitler stated, “Certainly we don’t have to discuss these matters with the Jews, the most modern inventors of this cultural perfume. Their whole existence is an embodied protest against the aesthetics of the Lord’s image.” (*Mein Kampf*, 168). In this instance it is clear to whom the Germans felt they were more superior.

After many years of feeling put down and let down, the Germans needed someone to blame, and that person came in the form of the Jew. After the fall of the German Empire in the Great War, Germans felt as they did for those 700 years when they were without direction. They felt as though they were lost, and there had to be someone to blame, someone who was at fault because it certainly wasn’t the Germans and their superior thoughts and plans. That someone would be the Jew. In the aforementioned quote, Hitler was saying that the Jews are anathema to what God actually intended man to be. Eventually it is clearer that what Hitler meant was that while the Jews are the complete opposite to what God intended, the Germans are exactly what God intended for man. He felt this, and historically, so did a few other Germans of note.
Richard Wagner was, and still is, quite revered for his musical creations. It is felt in some classical circles that he was one of the best composers who ever lived, and rightfully so. But there was more to Wagner than just the “Ring Cycle.” Wagner wanted, in an article he wrote, to give the German people someone to hate, a crux of all of their problems if you will. He did this through his constant barrage about the artistic capability of the Jews as a people. He continually stated that they are inept when it comes to this, and that all they are doing is “verjudung.” They are “be-jawing” the modern art world. He felt that they somehow infiltrated the modern world with the sole purpose of taking control of it, and destroying the art that had insofar been developed with their inept ability and cultureless ways.

When he stated, “…with all our speaking and writing in favour of the Jews’ emancipation, we always felt instinctively repelled by any actual, operative contact with them.” (Wagner, 2), he was making a case for the German people. He gave them a reason for their downfall, a reason why they could not pick themselves up, and that reason was in the form of this culturally inept human being. Like Hitler in the twenties and the thirties, he was playing on their emotions and the fact that they were totally without any hope. He was giving, like Hitler would, someone to blame besides themselves, a reason to pick themselves up. We will see later on that propaganda can be very good at motivating the masses. This becomes a basis for the Third Reich’s power, the hatred of the Jew, and Hitler conveyed this hatred to the masses through the most brilliant use of propaganda ever used. Hitler used the Jew and the emotions of the German people to gain total control of the German State and rebuild his empire within this power structure.

In a further note of the superiority of the German spirituality, Wagner spoke about, “the Jew-who, as everyone knows, has a God all to himself…”(Wagner,4). He here is stating the fact that the Germans in 1850 felt that the Jews owned everything, and that they were the holders of all of the money. Their God, as Wagner is speaking, the one that they have all to themselves, is money. This gave the German people one more reason to hate the Jewish people. And it also perpetuated the German idea of power and spiritual superiority. For, “the Jew speaks the language of the nation in whose midst he dwells
from generation to generation, but he speaks it always as an alien.” (Wagner, 4). With this statement, Wagner was professing that the Jew is without nation, and hence without a God, and furthermore, without spirituality. The Jews infiltrated their society, their world, and he was giving the German people a reason for hatred, a hatred hat in the near future would be handy in the fact that it would be the source of the power for the Third Reich.

*The Salvation of War, and Muscular Domination*

Adolf Hitler came to be Chancellor of Germany in 1933, and he brought Nazism with his to the power seat of Germany. Paul Otto von Hindenburg was ailing, and all involved knew that Hitler would soon be the sole power in Germany, the Fuehrer. Along with his hatred of the Jews, which he used as the basis for power within the Third Reich, he also had a strong feeling about war being sacred, and that it would be the salvation of Germany so that she could one day be great again.

In *Mein Kampf*, he stated, “the waves of historic events seemed to have grown so smooth that the future that the future really seemed to belong only to the ‘peaceful contest of nations’; in other words, a cozy mutual swindling match with the exclusion of violent methods of defense.” (*Mein Kampf*, 157). What he was postulating was that he felt that the peaceful times that Germany was facing were detrimental to the well being of Germany. He felt that peace was not a good thing, what Germany needed was a war to gain her prominence again. He had no use for negotiations which he saw as swindling. He only saw use for war, and “violent methods of defense.” In this, he also saw the opportunity for Germany to flex her military muscle, showing the idea of muscular, masculine fortitude.

He went on to ask, “Why couldn’t I have been born a hundred years earlier? Say at the time of the Wars of Liberation when a man, even without a ‘business,’ was really worth something?!” (*Mein Kampf*, 157). Again, here he showed that he believed that Germany could only reach pure attainment through war, and that real men, *ubermensches*, go
through war and prove themselves. War was the salvation, and as was becoming evident in his writings and speeches, the basis for his ideas on power.

One thing that Hitler also understood in Germany was that when you are in power, you want to stay in power. What would be the best way to do so then? You must eliminate all other parties and their affiliates. “On the evening of January 30, 1933, no one doubted that the Weimar Republic was dead, but people differed in their visions of what the future held.” (Schulze, 245). This statement from *Germany: A New History*, shows the temperature in Germany on the night that Hitler seized power for the next twelve years. People knew that their government was going to change, and that their lives were going to as well. But they did not know to what end. Hitler would soon show them.

None of the parties within Germany thought of banding together in order to hold off the danger of losing their positions. They stayed to themselves, and in that way made perfect targets for someone wishing to have total control. The more conservative of the groups on Hitler’s side thought that he would be held in check, and that they had him under control. They didn’t fear any overthrow of the power system. People in that realm thought that Hitler could be controlled, for the perils of the Second Great War were a distance away. All the while that the people in power thought that they had Hitler in check, he was playing a power game of his own. He was on the way to becoming a dictator.

He did this through the dissolution of all competition. “…Hitler first had to establish National Socialist rule irreversibly and make the party a dominant presence everywhere in the country.” (Schulze, 247). It took him a year and a half to take complete control of the country. This all ties in to the fact that power was the basis for the German Empire, and this power would be the downfall thereof. After he had eliminated the opposing parties within Germany, “By mid-1933 only one party existed in Germany, the party of Adolf Hitler.” (Schulze, 249). These statements show that Hitler was bent on the holding of power, and he felt that that power would be the reason for Germany to once again be at
the top. And there was only one man who could lead Germany at this time, one *real* man, and that was Adolf Hitler.

**Conclusions**

In closing, this essay has tried to prove that Germany and her leaders, no matter who they were, have always been bent on the building of empire, and the making of that empire has always led to the downfall of the country. Power, the state, the masses, coercion, all are old ideas. The way that Germany used them though was profound in its effect even today. There were social parallels that could be drawn from Hitler to Bismarck, for both had a profound effect on the outcome of their country. But, each time, Germany has found in the end, that the idea of an empire is one that will not work, especially when you make the basis for your empire power and that power comes from hatred.
The Changing Elites of Echo Island, 1821-1917 - Jay Spaulding

Introduction

The modern culture of the northern Sudan, and not least those aspects of culture that bear upon the issue of gender relations, have often been interpreted in terms of Arab and Islamic principles. While the importance of this paradigm to understanding the present and very recent past is obvious, a satisfying historical perspective would also wish to include comprehension of when and how present realities were constructed.¹ An unusually rich collection of nineteenth-century private legal documents from the community of Echo Island (Jazirat Abu Ranat) in the Shaiqiyya country allows the exploration of this theme in some detail. For example, it is possible to demonstrate that as recently as the middle years of the nineteenth century father's-brother's-daughter marriage (or indeed, cousin marriage in any form) was not a preferred cultural practice, nor was virginity at marriage valued in tangible terms.² Familiar modern conceptions of marital propriety may therefore not be taken as infallible guides to past behaviors.

The present study explores the complex micropolitics that governed the conduct of marriage on Echo Island among the families of the community that may be considered elite—elite either because they were an old family, a large family, a family of special religious distinction, or a family who owned a saqiyya landholding.³ The study begins with the hypothesis that at least in the beginning there may have been a certain amount of social distance between families of longstanding repute in the area and newly rich who first rose to prosperity under the nineteenth-century Turkish colonial regime. The micropolitics of matrimony will be seen in the patterns of intermarriage that may be discerned among the several diverse segments of the elite. Were these segments largely endogamous, or was intermarriage among fractions of the elite common? Did the behaviors evidenced by the Echo Island archive change significantly over time, or were they consistent throughout the period? Finally, how did these patterns correlate with the material values of bridewealth and of marriage settlement or halal?
The social theorist Jane Fishburne Collier has demonstrated that very important differences in the whole organization of society obtain between groups who marry with equal bridewealth, on the one hand, and competitive bridewealth, on the other. One-bridewealth societies tend to distribute wealth and power fairly equally among family units, whereas unequal-bridewealth arrangements are consonant with the rise of competition and social hierarchy. Unequal bridewealth tends to generate wide differences in size, wealth and status among family groups.\textsuperscript{4} The recent precolonial cultures of the northern Nile valley Sudan were state societies in which the government of the kings imposed the principle of equal bridewealth upon the class of subjects through decree, backed up when necessary by the forcible imposition of unremunerated matrimony upon the recalcitrant. In the Nubian linguistic tradition that immediately preceded Arabic on Echo Island, traditional equal bridewealth marriage was called \textit{kora}. Subjects themselves may also have accepted the viewpoint that equal bridewealth might be preferable to competitive arrangements, for in some cases they continued to impose \textit{kora} upon themselves voluntarily even into the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{5} It is therefore highly significant that on nineteenth-century Echo Island a change from equal to competitive bridewealth took place at about midcentury.

In early years the elite families of Echo Island evaluated their bridewealth payments in terms of a notional currency considered to be equal to silver coins, or \textit{ashraf}. One may perhaps infer that one set rate for bridewealth prevailed across the community from the fact that the scribe who drafted one of the earliest bridewealth certificates felt no need to specify what the payment actually was, referring to it merely as "a bridewealth of known quantity."\textsuperscript{6} This interpretation is supported by the fact that in the overwhelming majority of cases, indeed with only one exception among those instances for which intact rated marriage certificates exist, people married with the same bridewealth, namely, 700 \textit{ashraf}.\textsuperscript{7} In the single exceptional case, at the marriage in 1847 of a prominent holy man soon to become the political and spiritual leader of the community, the bridewealth transferred was rated not at 700, but rather 1000 \textit{ashraf}.\textsuperscript{8} The transformation toward a
new conception of bridewealth began at the close of the 1850s, as instances of unrated
bridewealth payment began greatly to exceed rated ones; the last rated bridewealth
certificate was written in 1865. 9 Under the new system that came to prevail after
midcentury there was no assertion that the value of one bridewealth was, or should be,
equal to that of any other. Rather, the cash or specie equivalent of each component part
of the bridewealth was specified in the marriage certificate, so that although the total
currency equivalent was not always or necessarily actually written into the document
itself, when absent it could nevertheless easily be calculated--no longer in notional
ashraf, but in real coin currency. The values expressed were no longer equal, or even
proximate, but ranged widely from 125 to 5,825 piastres. 10 Bridewealth had become an
arena for the exercise of competitive aggrandizement.

*From Endogamy to Social Climbing*

The documents from Echo Island record the existence of 100 marriages; for purposes of
reference each has been given a number (M001 through M100). The amount of
information given about these matches varies considerably, and in some cases is
insufficient to allow further analysis. One may establish a midpoint for the century at the
close of 1852 that divides the experience of the community into two balanced periods for
purposes of comparison. The issue to be examined is whether or not there were
discernable changes in the patterns of intermarriage among elements of the elite as the
century passed.

Elite families on Echo Island may be divided into two groups on the basis of whether or
not they were "old" families of long standing in the area, or newly rich families whose
prosperity derived primarily from the colonial age itself. Families on Echo Island of
more than three known generations are considered to be members of the elite by virtue of
being "old." Other families derived their eligibility for elite status from their sheer size,
from religious distinction in the form of the Khatmiyya brotherhood title khalifa, or from
the possession of a saqiyya holding, a unit of land irrigated by an ox-driven waterwheel.
Out of the forty island families ranked as "old" all were also "large," while thirty-five
owned *saqiyya* holdings too; seven out of the ten attested *khalifas* likewise belonged to this group of families, who clearly dominated all available forms of distinction. A second group of elite families, twenty-one in number, were not old, but either owned a *saqiyya* holding (twenty), were simply large (twelve, all of whom also owned *saqiyyas*), or had a *khalifa* (three). The rest of Echo Island's ninety-one recorded families are considered outside the elite, and comprise a third matrimonial constituency.

Eighty-one marriages involved at least one member of an elite family. Before midcentury each of the elite groups was largely, though not exclusively, endogamous; old families tended to marry old families, while the newly rich, at that time not abundantly represented in the documentary record, apparently usually married others of their own kind, or outside the elite. After midcentury, however, the numbers of newly rich in the documentary record increased, and mixed marriages became as common as marriage within one's own group. The difference between periods carries statistical significance (*C*=.3001). The upstart families of the colonial age abruptly stopped marrying each other at midcentury, as had hitherto been normal, for now they were able to begin to aspire to join the long-established families through marriage.

There were two possible scenarios for such social climbing. In one case, a man might marry a woman from the family of his social betters. This did occasionally occur, and it happened somewhat more frequently after midcentury than before; however, these marriages were always comparatively rare and the difference between the two periods was not statistically significant. In the alternative instance, a woman would marry into the family of her social betters. Before midcentury this theoretical possibility was in practice utterly unknown; after midcentury, however, it became common, and the change is statistically significant (*C*=.3702). It would seem that the marriage of a daughter or sister to one's betters had become a preferred strategy of upward mobility, particularly among the newly rich, and that the acceptance of such a spouse seemed less controversial to families of the old elite than would the arrival of her male counterpart.
Unusually detailed evidence from the 1860s allows some additional insight into conditions immediately after midcentury. The smallest bridewealth was paid in those rare cases where two newly rich families intermarried; there the median bridewealth was 193 riyals.\footnote{15} In cases where newly rich women or men married up into the old elite the average bridewealth was much larger (896 and 811 riyals respectively), but the difference between the two alternative modes of social climbing was not great.\footnote{16} Marriages within the old elite commanded a still higher average bridewealth of 1269 riyals.\footnote{17} For the 1860s it is possible to test the hypothesis that the old families would probably have held most of their wealth in the form of land, whereas the newly rich would have earned their wealth through trade or moneylending and would not yet have bought their way into landholding to the same extent as the old families. The measure used to test this idea was the percentage of bridewealth offered in the form of gold or silver jewelry as opposed to land. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, the proportion of bridewealth in the form of precious metals was actually higher among the old elite than among the upstarts.\footnote{18} This may mean that the old elite had taken an early lead in introducing the cultivation of high-quality dates such as Barakawi and Gondeila for export.\footnote{19} This enterprise was to be the major source of cash for the whole Shaiqiyya country by century's end, and landholding was a prerequisite to success, not a pleasant consequence.

\textit{Marriage Settlement (halal) in Historical Perspective}

The evidence of the legal documents from Echo Island suggests that the presence or absence of the marriage settlement ($halal$) had little connection to the issue of power relationships among families discussed above. Some marriages of all types, from both the period before 1852 and from the age that followed did incorporate a settlement, while the majority of marriages at all times did not. In cases of social climbing through marriage it was extremely unusual for a woman who married up to bring a $halal$.\footnote{20} When a man married up it would seem that in about half the recorded instances his wife brought a $halal$ to the marriage, while in the other cases she did not.\footnote{21} Only one conspicuous pattern may be discerned in the array of evidence; despite the demonstrably prosperous status of their families, the upwardly-mobile women of the 1860s did not ordinarily bring
a settlement to their marriages. Marriage settlement, present in about one third of all marriages before and after, was rare during this decade.\textsuperscript{22}

Having largely excluded motives grounded in the gross patterns of intermarriage among fractions of the elite, one may suggest that the presence or absence of a marriage settlement speaks meaningfully at a more subtle level to a bride's status within her new family. The distinction between marriages with and without a marriage settlement partook of some of the quality of the social theorist Karen Sacks' differentiation between "sisters," who bring into a marriage and retain there a measure of their social identity as a member of their natal family, as opposed to "wives," whose previous rights are subsumed upon marriage into that of the husband's family.\textsuperscript{23} The presence or absence of a marriage settlement in the constitution of one marriage could hardly fail to bear considerable significance to the conduct of marriage micropolitics in the next generation, for one of the major purposes toward which the wealth transferred at marriage was directed was the composition of future bridewealth for the new bride's anticipated son.\textsuperscript{24} One may infer that in these circumstances a woman who brought substantial material resources to a marriage would have enjoyed a different and more favorable status than one who did not. It is therefore meaningful that although marriages with halal, comparatively favorable to women, were fairly common both before about 1860 and after about 1870, such marriages virtually disappeared during the intervening decade of rapid and dramatic social change.

\textit{Conclusion}

The micropolitics of elite marriage on nineteenth-century Echo Island changed at about midcentury. Older communitarian norms collapsed under the pressures of commoditization, and as competition replaced custom, upstarts of the colonial age began to penetrate the elite. They did so, however, not by simply buying their way in through bridewealth payments, as their manifest wealth might have led one to expect. Rather, they advanced their sisters and daughters, on comparatively unfavorable terms, as matrimonial bait.
FACISM - Peter Williams

Introduction

The nature of ideology in a historical movement is a concept which does not lend itself easily to a static definition in the historiographical sense, regardless of a particular ideology’s inherent complexity or lack thereof. In the case of fascism, rather in its temporal manifestation as an international historical movement during the modern era, it is precisely this complexity which forms the widespread debate now surrounding it. Regarding its comprehension, explanation, and consequently, its overall place in history as defined by historians and the various branches of history they pledge their allegiance to, it seems evident that a synthesis of these perceptions and ideas would remain rather fleeting and in some cases impossible to achieve. With any movement influenced by ideology, often times what one finds is a vast body of literature containing blatant dissimilarities and stark contradictions which tend to obscure both inarguably generic and salient features, exacerbating the problem of clearly defining the subject even further. However curious it may seem at first glance, it is precisely the sizeable literature of fascism (at times inconsistent) which allows scholars and students patient enough to sift through the various data an exciting opportunity to reach such a synthesis.

The key to understanding fascism is being able to face the complex challenges presented when an ideology manifests itself in the temporal setting as a socio-political reality, however impermanent that reality may have been. This is primarily what fascism seemed to accomplish in the twentieth century; that it became a transitory reality in some
countries, which makes it one of the most fascinating topics of research in recent history. Again, this becomes apparent when one accounts for the amount of existing literature on the subject. But the operating word here is seemed. During the course of researching this complicated topic, certain questions invariably arise: Can an ideology such as fascism be realized or is it bound permanently to it conceptual and theoretical applications? Are the shortcomings and failures of a specific ideology just that; that it cannot function as a governing principle when implemented into reality due to the very conceptual nature intrinsic to political thought? These are only some of the questions that come up when examining fascism as a historical movement.

Answers arrive in many forms. What remains difficult for the contemporary historian is to be able to discern the key features of a seemingly spontaneous and in some instances overtly irrational movement such as fascism. Fortunately, the current historical community contains within it many different branches of thought (which may operate dependently or independently of one another, as we will see) which seek to tackle such nuanced obstructions. In order to elucidate the fascist phenomenon on either a basic or intricate level (more preferably both), various schools must be consulted, especially if synthesis is the purported goal. As with any historical event, this is the only way a synthesis of varying historical perspectives can be achieved. Obviously, some schools are more adept at explaining the fascist movement than others, and as such, are to be referred to on that basis. To provide a useful frame of reference in theory, Anna Green and Kathleen Troup’s *The Houses of History* (1999) has been employed.
Empiricism

It is important to note that even convincing empirical accounts of the time period in which fascism first emerged may be misleading, unless the fascist ideology is separated from the historical events which transpired after its conception, particularly within its European context. In this section, both ideology and event will be examined by the traditional, empirical method. A quick recap of empiricism here will suffice. Green and Troup describe empirical history as a method which utilizes the “inductive method of reasoning, from the particular to the general” and impartially deals with “irrefutable, factual information located at the heart of historical enquiry” (Green and Troup 4-5). Typically, when examining fascism through the empirical paradigm, it soon becomes evident that the ‘general’ arises more than the ‘particular.’ This is one of the inherent weaknesses of empirical history. Nevertheless, the traditional methodology invites a host of comparisons with other general interpretations of an empirical persuasion. As such, these features may help to serve as a useful point of departure for defining fascism’s salient characteristics, in both ideological terms and its political manifestation.

Regarding the origin of the fascist ideology, noteworthy fascist scholar George L. Mosse has illustrated crucial traits in fascism’s initial European formation during the early twentieth century. In his article entitled *Introduction: The Genesis of Fascism* Mosse contends that “all over Europe [fascism] sprang out of a common set of problems and proposed a common solution to them” (Mosse, qtd. in Laqueur 14). It is important to note that although the actual term ‘fascist’ was originally derived from Mussolini’s authoritarian, nationalist political party, formed in 1919 named the *Fascisti* (which
empiricists say served as a model for future regimes), the “ideology originated in the attack on positivism and liberalism at the end of the nineteenth century…and was a general European phenomenon” (Mosse 14). It is irrefutable that, indeed, totalitarianism, as fascism is sometimes called “was a radical revolt against classical liberalism, which emerged decisively in the American and French Revolutions” (McKay, Hill, and Buckler 959). At the heart of liberalism stood the ideals of individualism, rationality, peaceful progress, economic freedom, and a strong middle-class. As a reaction, at the heart of fascism stood “willpower, conflict and violence worship” (McKay, Hill and Buckler 959). This consensus has been reached by mostly all modern scholars, but the statement in itself would make for a very broad argument. “The individual was infinitely less valuable than the state and there was no lasting rights, only temporary rewards for loyal and effective service” (McKay, Hill and Buckler 959). Mosse goes on to ascribe the role of agency to the masses which made the movements possible. He writes: “The conservatism of crowds was reborn in fascism itself as the instinct for national traditions and for the restoration of personal bonds, like the family, which seemed fragmented in modern society” and adds “in reality, definite limits were provided to this activism by the emphasis upon nationalism, racism, and the longing for a restoration of traditional morality” (Mosse 16). This is precisely why the movement took on an extremely reactionary position. *The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia* sheds further light on the political context in which fascism arose in a more concrete, chronological way:

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1 In his *Introduction: The Genesis of Fascism*, Mosse states that fascism “lacked a common founder” and had no doctrine which explicitly defined it, though certain attempts were made during the course of fascism’s transformation from ideology to political movement. Mussolini was one of the first fascist political leaders to make such an attempt (spec. in his *Doctrine of Fascism*, contained in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, published much later in 1932).
“The Russian Revolution (1917), the collapse of the Central Powers in 1918, and the disorders caused by Communist attempts to seize power in Germany, Italy, Hungary, and other countries greatly strengthened fascism’s appeal to many sections of the European populace. In Italy, particularly, social unrest was combined with nationalist dissatisfaction over the government’s failure to reap the promised fruits of victory after World War I” (The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 1).

Similarly, fascism’s political stage was set in Germany as a result of the crisis that was fomenting during the interwar period. The people of Germany experienced intense dissatisfaction with the restrictions imposed on them by the Versailles Treaty, written up by the victorious Allied Powers in 1919. Furthermore, the economic disaster following the collapse of the American stock market enabled the most alluring sides of fascism to take root in the collective mind, which was greatly exploited by emerging political figures such as the founder of the National Socialist German Worker’s Party (NSDAP), then a young man named Adolph Hitler. In fact, some revisionist historians such Ian Kershaw see these cataclysmic events as so utterly formative that absolute takeover by dictators such as Hitler in Germany, Franco in Spain, or Salazar in Portugal would not have been possible at all without the crisis that accompanied them. These same historians see many fascist demagogues as nothing more than ruthlessly calculating opportunists.

It is of no minor significance that the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the ‘Communist attempts to seize power in Germany’ so profoundly affected the way the two phenomena were perceived by those willing to see hope in fascism as a workable political solution. After all, the negative view of Communism couched in rhetoric promulgated by the fascist elite was a way to link socialism to a theme which was later developed—racism—

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the anti-Semitic variety. In fact, the epithet ‘Bolshevism’ was coined specifically for this convenient purpose, the usage of which was not limited to German politics - contrary to what many people still believe. Other fascist governments, such as Mussolini’s dictatorship in Italy, began to adopt the concept and use it as part of their political platforms as a way to inveigh against the evils of proletariat-led socialism (Kedward 155). This caused a fearful outlook of socialism in these nations, a threat which was perpetuated at length by fascist governments. Marxist socialism became national socialism’s greatest foe, and consequently, it’s most recognizable scapegoat.

It is difficult to readily agree with a narrative account of something conceptual or philosophical in nature, such as the subject being examined here; that is, the origin of the fascist ideology. Yet extremely relevant to its understanding (and most historians concur) is that the ideology managed to affect subsequent history so profoundly when, beginning in the 1920’s and 1930’s, its ‘doctrine’ was literally being fulfilled across the European continent, giving rise to massive, citizen-based movements centered primarily on intense national pride which found an outlet in the form of organized aggression. The very unsubtle appearance of the ultra-obedient European masses clamoring for action in many nations after 1920 confirms this point. An extremely violent rise to nationally-centered power in those nations whose fascist adherents adopted the ideology and applied it politically was the eventual outcome. In turn, this resulted in whole nations replete with ideologues bent on mobile combat, ready and willing to fulfill a plan they held to be divinely sanctioned. Finally, as a rather broad summation, fascism “remains a product of class conflict and capitalist crisis,” and aims at “destroying working-class movements as
it aligns itself with powerful capitalists and landowners, which appealed especially to the middle class and peasantry” (McKay, Hill and Buckley 960).

The ‘divine’ in these nations took on the form of a human personage, the all-powerful and extremely charismatic fascist dictator, thus inspiring the phenomenon known as the ‘cult of the leader,’ which can be seen in the followings of such figureheads as Mussolini and Hitler, among others such as the Belgian Rexist regime leader Leon Degrelle, to name only one. This is another way to ascribe the role of agency; in this instance, however, the agent role is tacked onto the dictator himself. A passage from *The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia* states that “salvation from rule by the mob and destruction of the existing social order can be affected only by an authoritarian leader who embodies the highest ideals of the nation” (*Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia* 1). Mosse describes this as the “magic influence of suggestion through the leader,” who acts as a medium with supernatural powers (Mosse 16).

These basic facts are integral to the whole concept of fascism, and are derived from the common empirical interpretation. Uniform agreement on generic features, overarching theories, and meta-narratives, however, are all tactics employed by empiricists, and contribute to the somewhat unfavorable reputation the traditional approach to history has recently received. Many of these seemingly inarguable, immutably fascist features are at root catch-all phrases, the dangers of which traditional history and its postmodern

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3 This entire section seeks to capture the most relevant features of fascism that are cited throughout fascist literature, and have been paraphrased in an attempt to avoid overstatement. It can be seen as a general summary. Helpful sources in this matter were *A History of Western Society*, Sixth ed. (1999); *The Wikipedia* (http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/fascism), (2004); *The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th* ed., (2003); and *Fascism in Western Europe: 1900-1945* by H.R. Kedward (1971).
enemies have become exceedingly aware. This is why it is of sound mind to enlist the strengths of some of the other branches of historical thought in order to elucidate even more specific, yet additionally significant features of fascism overlooked by the sometimes vague empirical approach.

*Psychohistory*

Green and Troup describe psychohistory as “the use of psychoanalysis to aid our understanding of historical personalities, groups or trends” and assert that psychohistory can explain the “irrational and more” throughout the past (Green and Troup 59, 66). The aim of Freudian psychoanalysis is to reveal unconscious motives or desires, and as such, may play a significant role in attempting to explain a curious period in history as well. Fixation at a certain psychosexual developmental phase determines an individual’s behavior and personality from that point on. Moreover, fixation determines how that individual seeks gratification thereafter.

Defenders of psychohistorical attempts to explain fascism argue that the extreme irrationality manifested by the Third Reich and similar regimes pushes impoverished explanatory models used by empiricists to their limits. Conventional historical methodology is inadequately equipped to explain the fascist phenomenon. Irrational extremes in history invite psychoanalysis because the methodology it employs may uncover the more veiled elements not discernible by logical analysis. Nevertheless, the assertion that psychohistory is too reductive is still up for debate. It is, however, an additional tool used to explain the multicausative complexities of modern fascism.
Eric Erikson’s groundbreaking psychoanalytic study of Hitler can be illustrated here as a model for other fascist leaders in the more general areas of examination. However, it should not in any way be used to make all of the formative psychological features in Hitler’s life applicable to every facet of something as complex as the whole fascist phenomenon. That being said, Erikson outlined the psychosexual stages of Hitler’s adolescent development and determined that he was fixed at the Oedipal phase, where the approval of the mother-figure is relentlessly sought. Because this need could not be properly met, Hitler’s formed an obsession which manifested itself in the exacerbated desire to seek power and approval, which led him to politics and ultimately enabled him to revert his aggression into forming and leading Germany’s Third Reich. The father figure, who in Hitler’s case prevented immediate gratification, then became a figure which Hitler came to abhor. Alois Hitler’s profession was that of civil service, which was typical for a male of his generation. Erikson pointed that as Hitler grew older, he associated his father with the vast political and economic unrest Germany experienced after World War I, mainly during the Weimar period, and sought to overthrow the existing order. Proof of this point is Hitler’s hope (and temporary success) in rebuilding the German Fatherland.

H.R. Kedward also set out to explain the irrational, unconscious dynamic of fascism manifested in the masses as well as in the personality of individual leaders. In reference to the attitude of the masses, Kedward states:

“All fascist movements placed emphasis on group action, on conformity, on mass loyalty, to the leader and on individual submission to an ideology. This has led many observers to compare fascism with

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4 From ‘The Legend of Hitler’s Childhood,’ originally printed in *Childhood and Society* (1950), a portion of which appears in Green and Troup’s *Houses of History* (1999).
the great religions of the world, which make similar demands on the individual...fascism is not radically new in its collective and authoritarian structure. The psychologist is insistent in stressing what appealed to very old and permanent aspects of the human mind” (Kedward 191).

This description invites comparison with Jungian collective psychoanalysis which stresses the importance of archetypes throughout the history of human civilization and the crucial role they play in mankind’s definition of itself throughout the human life cycle. Indeed, fascism can be seen as a primitive religious cult, with all its ritualistic associations. C.G. Jung believed, according to Kedward:

“that all men were connected with each other by a collective unconscious in which dark, but often creative forces were contained, linking the most civilized modern individual with the images of primitive society. As long as these forces could be acknowledged and put to imaginative and constructive use then man could be healthy, but once they were repressed and refused admission into the conscious life of the individual, they could become dangerous and might break out, bringing psychological sickness and destruction” (Kedward 192).

The psychology of mass fascism reveals these ‘dark forces of mankind’ which had previously been suppressed by earlier generations. Thus, a dialogue can be established between Erikson’s model of Hitler and Jung’s idea of the manifestation of repressed urges and is extremely useful if the period is to be comprehended on any level by the present day historian.

*Historical sociology*

Green and Troup introduce historical sociology as a discipline which combines history and important aspects of sociology in order to “address directly the distinction between explanations based on structures and those based on agency” (Green and Troup 110). One point enumerated in Theda Skocpol’s list of the characteristics of historical sociology is “the particular and varying features of specific kinds of social structures and patterns of change” (Green and Troup 110). Two key theorists, Max Weber and Emile
Durkheim, are linked with the development of historical sociology and their writing helps distinguish some of fascism’s more complicated structural features.

Roger Griffin’s article in the Encyclopedia of Community (2003) is extremely relevant to the current understanding of fascism through the socio-historical paradigm. He cites Ferdinand Tonnies, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber as critical voices which to consult if the socio-historical approach is to be considered.

In terms of the theories of Ferdinand Tönnies (1755-1836), inter-war fascism was an attempt to wipe away the evils of a society based on Gesellschaft (‘association’), the type of contractual and inherently pluralistic civil society with which the Weimar Republic became so widely identified, and replace it with the values and structures of an organic Gemeinschaft (‘community’).

If Émile Durkheim’s (1858-1917) theory of social cohesion is applied, the domestic policies of the two fascist regimes can be seen as attempts to recreate the bonds of ‘mechanical solidarity’ which he claims existed before they were gradually dissolved by modernization to be replaced by those of based on work, personal values, and class (which he somewhat idiosyncratically called the basis of ‘organic solidarity’). It was the inadequacy of organic solidarity to provide a shared cosmology and collective sense of transcendence that he claimed engendered the experience of profound isolation, meaninglessness, and despair he termed anomie. Fascism can thus be seen as an attempt to put an end to anomie through creating a powerful mythic
sense of roots, belonging, homeland, and higher fate enacted within a historical rather than a divine sphere of transcendence.

In the context of Max Weber’s (1864-1920) interpretation of modernity as the product of rationalization and disenchantment, the driving force of fascism in both Italy and Germany was the goal of regenerating a society debilitated by the decay of ‘traditional’ politics and the ineffectiveness of ‘legal rational’ politics through the power of ‘charismatic’ politics. Simultaneously, it sought to ‘re-enchant’ national life through deliberately exploiting the power of myth, political religion, and aesthetic politics to unite a nation in a common sense of strength and purpose. The intended result was a charismatic community, or what the Nazis called ‘a community of destiny’ (Schicksalsgemeinschaft), capable of ushering in a new era of civilization purged of both liberalism and communism, thereby granting a secular immortality to all its members by playing an integral part in a heroic period of the nation’s ‘sacred’ history.

Clearly, in these countries man had become extremely disillusioned by what he saw transpiring in the rapidly modernizing sector of the Western world, a feeling which was aggravated by the imperialistic actions of other, more industrialized (and thus more powerful) nations in the interwar period. Skocpol, in a more up-to-date article entitled France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions (1973) determines what makes some revolutions successful (as in the ones mentioned in her title) compared to others, which has much to do with the sociopolitical actions of modernizing nations.
To paraphrase, revolution was a necessary phase a nation had to undergo if it was to finally centralize (*modernize*), which didn’t mean that a single revolution would bring about this massive social change (evident in China’s case). A revolution would not come about if mobilization of peasant forces was stifled, and real social revolution occurred when peasants were allowed to overthrow the existing regime in power. The former depended on whether reform measures were successfully implemented and the latter came about when measures of attempted centralization ‘from above’ were simply impossible to achieve.

*Postmodernism*

Originating in literary circles in the 1960’s, postmodern/poststructural theory was conceived as an effective way to go back in time and through analysis, deconstruction, and re-interpretation (re-reading the received ‘text’ and its authority), find out what was really at stake when a ruler or regime came to power. According to this concept, proposed mainly by the French philosopher Michel Foucault, there are simply either people throughout history who have power or do not. In other words, postmodernists such as Foucault discuss who or what is actually being silenced or marginalized in order to reach in history the determination of “what is received without question as truth” (Green and Troup 302). This lead Foucault to discover that in traditional history there never has been any substantive or valid claims to truth because in reality he found that “knowledge and power are inextricably connected” and as such, what we know to be truthful of the past is only the result of dominant, prevailing systems of thought and has always ultimately been subjective at best (302). This is an important concept to grasp in the
historical context. As a result of this inseparable connection, Foucault concluded that “history writing can be a form of power… we use our knowledge to control and domesticate the past” (302). Since the appearance of postmodern theory, it has become almost passé to say that knowledge is power. But nowhere else can this be proven to such an articulate degree than in the fascist political model.

John Ralston Saul’s convincing exposition The Unconscious Civilization (1995) covers many aspects of present-day society’s obsession with mass communication and the proliferation of media technology. Saul turns our attention to the brainwashing effect it has had on today’s politics and consequently, on the people who participate in them. As stated in The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, fascism is “closely linked with the rejection of reason and intelligence” (CCE 1). Interestingly, Saul uses the contemporary American model of a media-saturated society to make a direct correlation with the indispensable role the fascist propaganda machine played in Europe during the early stages of ideological fascism. He astutely points out the power inherent in language; in the forms of rhetoric, propaganda, and dialect, and more importantly, sees how the interconnection keeps certain people in power and others out of it. Saul draws up many strong arguments as to how this was possible then and, frighteningly, how it still happens today. He writes: “For the ideologue, language itself becomes the message because there is no doubt. In a more sensible society, language is just a tool of communication” (Saul 41). Fascist governments stripped their own people of the privilege to democratically receive impartial information or news of what was happening in the world outside of their own homelands. This was one of the more calculated ploys incorporated into fascist
politics. He goes on to argue that in fascist societies and those similar, sophistication and culture are exploited by governments and made to look like corruption. Totalitarian dictators like Hitler, Mussolini, and even Stalin in the USSR were notoriously aware of this fact. These regimes, according to McKay, Hill, and Buckler “made ‘total claims’ on the beliefs and behavior of their respective citizens” (McKay, Hill, and Buckler 960). Saul believes that this injustice was perpetuated by the participation of academic fascists in the movement. He insists that “the majority of the academic leaders rushed forward to collaborate with the new, anti-democratic regimes, and began producing intellectual texts to beef up the official governmental corporative ideas” (Saul 71). He concludes that the principles, or lack thereof, which oversee current communication theories are not much different than the actual tactics employed by fascist governments in their heyday, when reaching the middle and lower class demographic was crucial to the spread and support of fascist dogma. Thus, Saul brings the decisive roles of power and control into the debate under a compelling postmodern paradigm.

Leon Surette also writes from this postmodern point of view, although he tactfully utilizes important aspects of literature that influenced fascist ideas. In his article Modernism, Postmodernism, Fascism, and Historicism (1991) Surette singles out certain key texts which turned out to be highly effective in subtly persuading Europeans interested in fascism to reject modernism as “corrupt, degenerate, or misguided and seek to replace (or supplement) it with a future” (Surette 483). Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, then, become fascism’s cultural prophets and are inextricably linked to the rise of fascism, according to Surette. Surette adds, “For all four of them, that future is the
rebirth of a primal past” (483). Quizzically, this future is to take place in the present. Heidegger directly followed his forebear Nietzsche on this point, and “hoped for the return of the golden age in a Teutonic apotheosis” while Derrida “denounces both the present and our post-Socratic past, and concludes that ‘we are in a region (let us say, provisionally, a region of historicity) where the category of choice seems particularly trivial;…[we are] faced by the as yet unnamable…in the offing…in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity’” (Derrida qtd. by Surette 484). The monstrosity he speaks of is modernism. All of this resulted in an attack on modernization, and fascism seemed again to be the obvious solution to the ‘problem.’ If the power/control model in postmodern theory can be logically followed, these authors had a significant amount of authority in their own right, and in wielding it, whether conscious of its effects on the future or not, presumably decided the violent outcome of the European fascist period. 5 Surette concludes that these authors “seem[ed] to have believed that the past could be recovered through the magical power of words- thereby redeeming history” (Surette 484). This certainly coincides with the ideas proposed by likeminded authors such as John Ralston Saul. The application, and consequently the effectiveness of postmodernist ‘discourse’ could not be any more palpable than in the cases of these two writers.

Conclusion: Is Synthesis Possible?

Although it is difficult to look past some of the apparent shortcomings of traditional history, it is plain to see that most literature on fascism today still uses this

5 For purely historical purposes, and not critical ones, this controversial point cannot surface here. The influence literature had on the movement has become the topic of ongoing debate since the conception of fascism, especially in regards to Nietzsche and his concept of the übermensch.
methodology in order to document the curious phenomenon, and is relatively successful in doing so. In fact, historians such as Kedward are representative of a rising trend in empirical revisionism and include different perspectives within one body of work. In recent times, this liberty has resulted in historical texts integrating many approaches to prevent generalization and misunderstanding. These overlapping details prevent the occurrence of manifold inconsistencies.

So, a unification of historical perspectives is not only possible, but is the most valuable way in which this tumultuous chapter in history can be properly understood. It is clear that psychohistory elucidates some of the more irrational, unconscious features of fascism while current themes, such as the inextricable connection of power and control, can be buttressed by the postmodern approach. Interestingly, fascism is a model topic for socio-historical inquiry. Historical sociology was practically conceived solely for the purpose of treating multifaceted topics such as fascism, although the exhaustive process of accumulating vast amounts of relevant socio-historical data may be frustrating at times. Research of fascism is facilitated by accessing information generated by all historical schools, as well as many others which were not presented in this study, although these schools may be just as adept at treating the problematic nature of fascism.

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http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history.html


http://ahbrookes.ac.uk/history/staff/griffin/encycomfascism.pdf; pages 4-5. (accessed using EBSCOhost Web).


Less than a week after American troops first set foot on German soil, reports of soldiers fraternizing with German civilians had already reached the United States. Associated Press and United Press correspondents filed stories about friendly German civilians who welcomed the invaders by offering them gifts of fruit and wishing them well. The New York Times printed both articles on 16 September and on the following day published a photograph that showed a smiling German family gathered around a jeep while they conversed with American soldiers.\textsuperscript{i} On 17 September, the day that photograph was published, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe contacted his commanding generals, ordering that such behavior be “nipped in the bud.” It was a violation of the Allied non-fraternization policy which banned “friendly, familiar, or intimate” contact between Allied soldiers and German nationals.\textsuperscript{ii} Four days later, Eisenhower received a message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt via Army chief of staff George C. Marshall. Roosevelt ordered Eisenhower to “discourage” fraternization, but the president was less concerned with behavior than appearances. He demanded that photographs documenting friendly relations between Germans and Americans be “prohibited.” On the following day, Eisenhower assured the president that he and his generals were committed to both concealing and suppressing friendly contact between Americans and Germans. Stories and photographs of fraternizing soldiers had been added to the Army’s list of censorable news items, and any documented violation of Army policy would be “dealt with by proper disciplinary procedure.”\textsuperscript{iii} Private correspondence was likewise censored, and letters that referred to serious violations of the ban were to be forwarded to the U.S. Army’s personnel section for further action.\textsuperscript{iv}

From the start, censoring letters, news reports, and photographs proved easier than enforcing the Army's non-fraternization policy. While the majority of Allied soldiers
probably conformed to the policy, a large minority did not, and violations increased as the war progressed. The problem of fraternization became more complicated once fighting stopped. Before VE Day, it was an internal issue of conduct and security; afterwards, it unfolded into a public relations nightmare. The Army retained the fraternization ban through the summer of 1945 with an eye to appeasing homefront opinion, but this strategy caused even greater scandal. Violations skyrocketed just as the Army’s censorship regulations were relaxed.

Fraternization exploded into a national debate in the summer of 1945. What troubled so many Americans, including the soldiers themselves, was the sexual nature of German-American relations. The Army’s ban covered all friendly mingling with former enemy nationals, but the term “fraternization” quickly became synonymous with illicit and adulterous sex. Although some servicemen attempted to shift the blame to unfaithful wives or uncooperative Wacs, this episode highlighted male, rather than female, sexual misconduct and threatened to sever the loving bonds that had sustained men and women through hardship and separation.

Months before the Allied invasion of France, the question of how soldiers should behave toward enemy nationals was a major topic of concern for American and British officials. Prior history suggested that prohibiting social relations would be futile. After World War I, occupation soldiers had been ordered to treat the conquered Germans with “dignified reserve,” but relations quickly grew warmer, due in part to the practice of billeting Allied soldiers with German families. The friendships resulting from the failure of anti-fraternization measures eased the administration of occupied territories. The problem, from the standpoint of Allied policymakers, was that Germans remained unconvinced of their war guilt after World War I. Determined to learn from past mistakes, they drew up new, more stringent rules of conduct. From the beginning, however, key military officials involved in formulating the non-fraternization policy predicted that the prescribed standard would be impossible to maintain.
Officially announced on 12 September 1944, one day after American troops first entered German territory, the Allied non-fraternization policy was designed to protect Americans and to punish Germans. The policy directive distributed to Army commanders in fall 1944 explained the need for non-fraternization primarily in terms of Nazi ideology and German versus American or British national character. Military planners anticipated that Germans, believing themselves a master race, would not accept defeat and that Allied forces would have to confront a strong guerrilla resistance movement assisted by a word-of-mouth propaganda campaign. Women, children, and old men might attempt to associate with Allied soldiers, appealing to their conquerors’ “generosity and spirit of fair play” in order to “influence the sympathies and thoughts of the occupying forces.” Their goal: to minimize “the consequences of defeat and prepar[e] the way for a resurgence of German power.” Non-fraternization was intended to combat such "insidious" stratagems and also to “command respect” from citizens of the occupied nation. Army planners believed that an aloof and well-disciplined occupation force would be particularly impressive to Germans, who had been taught to revere military order and power. Finally, the “avoidance of mingling” was intended to show German soldiers and civilians that their support of Adolf Hitler's National Socialist regime had “brought them complete defeat and . . . caused the other people of the world to look upon them with distrust.”

This directive was very clear about what constituted fraternization, but materials designed for the individual soldier were less straightforward. The non-fraternization policy prohibited social association between Allied soldiers and Germans and even restricted official contacts to “the minimum necessary.” A booklet issued to soldiers entering German territory in September 1944, however, served to confuse the situation by suggesting that soldiers might converse with Germans without violating military law. Designed to orient American soldiers on the Army’s policies toward Germany, the “Pocket Guide to Germany” was prepared by the Army Information Branch before the non-fraternization policy had been fully formulated. Like the Army’s “Pocket Guide to France,” this booklet included a guide to conversational German that, in Army historian Joseph R. Starr’s words, “would have been of use principally to those bent upon violating the policy of non-fraternization.” A soldier who read the guide could learn to introduce
himself to Germans; a quick study might have figured out how to barter with cigarettes and chocolate. To counteract possible misimpressions, a prominent white sticker was pasted to the front cover each black booklet, urging soldiers to “Keep faith with the American soldiers who have died to eliminate the German warmakers. DO NOT FRATERNIZE.” American troops received copies of the guide as they entered Germany in September 1944, but less than a month later, the booklet was withdrawn by order of Gen. Eisenhower. The more than a million soldiers who had received a copy were required to return it. The goal of this order was to keep American soldiers from engaging in friendly conversation with German civilians. viii The drawback was that without the guide, the Army lacked a document specifically designed to orient soldiers on the policy of non-fraternization.

The editors of Stars and Stripes attempted to fill this void with news stories, editorials, and cautionary tales intended to warn soldiers away from German civilians. They launched their anti-fraternization campaign with a 22 September 1944 editorial that cautioned American soldiers against giving gum to German children who—like other European children—begged for the treat. The editors explained that such gifts sent the wrong message: Americans came to Germany as conquerors, not "pals," "liberators," or "suckers." ix A few days later, the Army newspaper published a story about “enemy agents and soldiers in civilian clothes” believed to be responsible for the disappearance of three American military police. This story emphasized the importance of non-fraternization as a security measure against sneak attacks. x “Don’t get chummy with Jerry,” another editorial advised; civilians might seem friendly and harmless, but every German man, woman, and child was “part of the Nazi war machine.” xi The guide to German language printed to the left of The Stars and Stripes masthead was anything but friendly. Beginning on 4 October 1944, the newspaper taught American soldiers the vocabulary (with pronunciation guide) appropriate to a conquering force, words and phrases like: "surrender," "come here," and "step aside." xii

Although bombarded with non-fraternization messages from a variety of sources, American soldiers did not receive individual orders until December 1944, when the Army
issued its “special ‘battle’ orders” for German-American relations. Published in the form of a small booklet designed to be tucked inside a helmet liner, these orders instructed soldiers to avoid contact with Germans except on official business. On those unavoidable occasions, the Army advised servicemen to be “firm but fair,” warning that kindness would be regarded as weakness. Germans were ruthless and remorseless, waiting to take advantage of any relaxation of Allied vigilance.

The stern tone of the Army’s orders and pronouncements was not equaled by enforcement of the ban. Posing as an enlisted combat replacement, Maj. Arthur Goodfriend, editor-in-chief of *The Stars and Stripes* in Europe, investigated the ineffectiveness of the non-fraternization policy in fall 1944. “Pvt. Arthur Goodwin” was assigned to an infantry unit near Aachen where he interviewed his temporary comrades and witnessed several troubling incidents of American kindness and carelessness toward German civilians. American soldiers treated German civilians as a liberated rather than a conquered people; they played with local children, assisted housewives with their chores, and provided food to hungry families. Violations of Army policy were flagrant. Both officers and enlisted men disregarded the fraternization ban, but not one man had been court-martialed for unlawfully associating with German civilians.

Goodfriend warned that the domestic temptations represented by German women were a particular danger to the enforcement of military law. Confined to an organization of men, soldiers longed for the company of women. Goodwin explained, “The mere fact that German companionship can generally be found indoors—a welcome relief from the cold, wet and mud without—is an important influence.” The promise of cleanliness and warmth tempted American soldiers to enter German homes as “sanctuar[ies] from the misery and indignity of living and fighting through a winter campaign.”

Although Goodfriend’s analysis ignored the sexual desires motivating servicemen to seek the company of women, the editors of *The Stars and Stripes* were well aware of the danger. In an 18 October 1944 editorial, they warned their readers to beware of “Jerry’s deadliest V weapon—VD.” This equation of women and weapons was common in
Army v.d. prevention materials. In the summer of 1943, for example, one “educational” poster designed to combat a wave of syphilis in England pictured a pistol floating above the heads of three “loose” women. The question, “Loaded?” was superimposed between the women and the gun. “Don’t take chances with pickups,” the poster warned. “Loose women may also be loaded with disease.” The difference was that in the case of German women, the transmission of sexual diseases might be a deliberate plot to emasculate America’s fighting forces. This message was transmitted in a radio announcement:

A tap tapping of heels, a German girl walking by—pretty to look at. Her smile is nice too.

Don’t play Samson to her Delilah... she’d like to cut your hair off—off at the neck.

Don’t fraternize!

Like the biblical seductress Delilah who betrayed her lover Samson, such women, the radio spot suggested, were beautiful but dangerous. They lured American lovers into bed with the goal of killing or castrating the men. This announcement was one of a series of anti-fraternization messages broadcast regularly over American forces radio in the winter and spring of 1945. They were designed to scare American soldiers away from German civilians. Several, like the one above, focused on the specific dangers of associating with women. As the fighting in Germany progressed, it quickly became clear to U.S. Army officials that pretty women posed the greatest danger to the anti-fraternization policy.

Army journalists, likewise, advised American soldiers to beware of German women working to subvert an Allied victory. “Lady in White,” a purportedly true story printed in a special non-fraternization issue of Warweek (a weekly insert in The Stars and Stripes), told of a “mystery woman” who appeared every night near American lines wearing a white gown that looked transparent in the moonlight. Both beautiful and deadly, she was a spotter who helped German artillery target American troops, but by day, she was indistinguishable from the other civilian women who lived near American lines. A few weeks later, Stars and Stripes editors warned their readers against giving
rides to female refugees walking along German roads: “The hitchhiker looks like a harmless sort of gal. Like an ordinary civilian trying to get away from the war. And maybe she is.” But, the editorial warned, she might be an agent in disguise, carrying radio equipment in her bags that would allow her to transmit American conversations to her German superiors. xx

While representations of female spies and spotters were based on actual cases, most women encountered by American soldiers in fall 1944 and winter 1945 did not resist the advances of their American conquerors. In the 1930s, many of these women had supported (or at least not opposed) the Nazi regime; perhaps they had joined the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel). If young and unmarried once the war began, they might have been drafted for service to the state on farms, in factories, or in the Army. But after years of devastating aerial attacks by Allied bombers and with the German Army in wholesale retreat, civilians of both sexes looked to American troops for freedom from the hardships of war. During the early days of the American invasion, many of the civilians who remained behind resisted orders to evacuate; they greeted advancing American ground troops with smiles, waves, and V-signs.

Although told to expect resistance, American soldiers encountered little opposition from German civilians. By most accounts, Germans were extremely docile and eager to please their conquerors. While some servicemen argued that these civilians should be treated with kindness, others viewed German friendliness with distrust. To their eyes, civilians’ claims of ignorance and innocence looked like attempts to evade responsibility for Nazi atrocities. Furthermore, seeming friendliness might cloak nefarious intentions. Soldiers suspected women and children near American lines of spying for the German Army. Some Americans attributed even more deadly plans to German civilians, blaming them for soldiers who had been shot down in the street, stabbed in the back, poisoned by bad food or alcohol, or deliberately infected with venereal disease. xxi

In addition to seductive civilian saboteurs, American military police represented a danger (albeit less deadly) to soldiers who wished to associate with German civilians. The
Army’s non-fraternization policy, although designed to protect Americans and to punish Germans, actually penalized Americans but not Germans. xxii A soldier found guilty of fraternizing might be fined, jailed, and reduced in rank, while his partner-in-crime went scot-free. This frustrating situation spurred protests by soldiers xxiii and debates among Army officials about whether and how to punish Germans. xxiv The problem was that, during the war, Germans were often unaware of the non-fraternization order, and even if they were, punishing them for associating with American soldiers defeated the ban’s intended purpose. Such a practice would suggest to Germans that the U.S. Army was unable to control its soldiers, instead of demonstrating civilized abhorrence for German militarism. If Germans were legally responsible for fraternizing, American soldiers might excuse themselves from conforming to Army discipline. Finally, imprisonment was probably not an effective threat to hungry people, many of whom had lost their homes. In the end, the idea of charging Germans with violating the Army’s non-fraternization policy was rejected in favor of placing large sections of German towns “off limits” to American troops. Germans could then be charged with the offense of “[i]nviting or conducting any member of the Allied Forces into a place designated ‘Off Limits’ or ‘Out of Bounds,’ or supplying goods or services to such member in any place.” xxv While Army policymakers recognized that the decision to violate the fraternization ban rested with American soldiers, they nevertheless wished to reallocate blame.

By the early months of 1945, the misconduct of American soldiers had become an undeniable problem. Censored letters from February 1945 revealed divided opinions on the fraternization ban and a considerable amount of fraternizing. Many servicemen heeded the warnings with which they were bombarded, commending the Army's policy and asserting that they had no wish to socialize with “Hitler’s frauleins.” xxvi Others testified to sexual frustration and bemoaned the penalties imposed by the fraternization ban: "If only I could figure out a way to beat this fraternization thing," one infantryman wrote. "Honest, these darn women are driving me nuts." xxvii But as early as February 1945, some American soldiers had already begun to brag about German girlfriends xxviii
Censored letters and news articles indicated that by early spring American soldiers, undeterred by threatened punishments, were flagrantly violating the fraternization ban. In March 1945, an Associated Press reporter interviewed Sgt. Francis W. Mitchell who was among the first American troops to enter the German city of Cologne. Based on the interview, the writer described this scene in the ruined city: German civilians greeted American soldiers by tossing them loaves of bread and feeding them beer, pretzels, and cherry preserves. Meanwhile young women (“very pretty too,” Mitchell commented) played music on a phonograph. “It got real cozy,” Mitchell said, ”but soon we had to break it off to get on with the job.” The article concluded that the fraternization ban could only be enforced once military police arrived. The reporter quoted Mitchell, “Non-fraternization works if somebody is there, with a club, but right at the front where a soldier is risking death, you cannot scare him with a $65 fine.”

The problem, according to *Stars and Stripes*, was that military police and other occupation personnel were busy performing more pressing duties. The fast pace of the American advance left them far too busy to enforce the Army’s fraternization ban. By March 1945, lonely soldiers who longed for feminine company might violate Army policy with little fear of punishment. This news article, however, only tells part of the story. Observation and interviews of American soldiers by Army social science researchers in April 1945 revealed that men performing occupation duties were among the worst offenders of the fraternization ban. Assigned to one location for several weeks, they found time to form liaisons with the local population. Many of the men assigned to these jobs had casual sexual contact with German women, and some had regular girlfriends. Frontline soldiers had fewer opportunities to establish such relationships, but when the fighting stopped, they quickly caught up, as evidenced by the skyrocketing rate of sexually transmitted diseases among former combat troops during the first months of occupation.

The seduction was not one-sided. To the eyes of many American servicemen, German women were astonishingly forward. They gathered on the sidewalks near Army billets, “talking and laughing among themselves, and smiling at passing soldiers.” The smiles
were sexual invitations. Pretty women rode bicycles in front of American soldiers; their goal was to display shapely legs. These actions provoked the desired response, turning soldiers’ heads as the women rode by. The motives for this behavior were a mystery to Army investigators. Never considering how hunger might serve as sexual incentive, social scientists speculated that such displays were “spontaneous reaction[s] to prolonged [sexual] deprivation,” possibly a result of German soldier worship. They also feared that German seductiveness might be part of a “deliberate program of subversion.” Whatever the underlying intent, flirtatious behavior attracted the attention of the men assigned to occupation duties, among whom violations of the fraternization ban were common. Army field observers predicted that the “woman problem” would only grow worse after VE Day. xxxii

During the late months of the European war, the problem of fraternization took on an “ugly new angle.” In March 1945, *Stars and Stripes* correspondent Ernest Leiser reported that American soldiers were responsible for a wave of violent sexual attacks on German women. xxxiii This article was never published. Instead, a little over two months later, the Army newspaper reported a wave of false rape charges, a “subtle sabotage” of American occupation forces. xxxiv An Army poster entitled “Hello Sucker” expanded this theme by depicting a shapely German woman beckoning a soldier into a tavern. Sitting on his lap, she raised a glass to his lips; later in bed, she yelled “rape.” xxxv While publicly accusing German women of sabotage and perjury, military officials were privately troubled by the astonishing increase in rape charges from 31 in February 1945 to 402 in March and 501 in April. xxxvi These numbers are small by comparison to those attributed to the Red Army, but both U.S. Army judges and military police believed that rape charges represented only a small portion of actual assaults by American soldiers. Many German women were reluctant to bring their cases to the attention of Allied officials, and only the most violent attacks and furious self-defenses actually went to trial. xxxvii Under American military law, rape was a matter less of consent than the degree of physical resistance. xxxviii
One case from the final weeks of the European war illustrates the difficulties Army officials experienced in deterring sexual violence and judging rape cases. Here are the details: On April 27 and 28, 1945, eight enlisted members of a field artillery battalion entered a German house near their gun position in Geisling. They went to wash up, shave, and drink schnapps. Inside the house, they found two women living with an elderly bedridden man. Over the course of two days, at least three of the eight men had sexual intercourse with the two women on several occasions. The women did not struggle, but they did not submit willingly. The Americans outnumbered the women and carried guns. One of the two women could not identify the soldiers who undressed and penetrated her but remembered crying as they did so. The other woman, a Frau D, recognized the men she accused of raping her. She testified that on the evening of April 27, she was awakened by a man holding what looked like a pistol, taken from her room, and raped by her abductor and several of his comrades. The following day, Frau D. grabbed hold of the kitchen stove when a soldier tried to pull her into the bedroom. He succeeded and had sexual intercourse with her while she, in her own words, lay “like a piece of wood.” Three other men followed their comrade’s example and violated her again. A little over a week later, the men involved were arrested on rape and fraternization charges, although the person who brought charges against them remains a mystery.

This incident followed a scenario that was common during the late months of the European war. Armed soldiers entered an enemy house and engaged in sexual intercourse with the female occupants. In some cases, they threatened the women with violence. Usually the threat was implicit. Some servicemen were caught in the act or charged afterwards, but most went free, because fear also inhibited women from reporting the crime.

The details of this otherwise unremarkable case have been preserved, because approximately five days after the arrest, the commanding general of the artillery corps to which the accused men belonged called battalion officers and non-commissioned officers to assemble before him. Brig. Gen. S delivered a lecture to his men, using this case to
illustrate the seriousness and dire consequences of rape. Directly following this meeting, the general had the arrested enlisted men brought before him and several other officers. The precise wording of the general’s statement was a matter of dispute, but all involved agreed that he had threatened the accused rapists with quick conviction and execution. Although this incident had an ameliorating effect on discipline within the corps, it triggered an investigation of the general’s actions. While awaiting trial, the alarmed enlisted men wrote letters to Senator Beriah Green from Rhode Island and to Justice William O. Douglas of the Supreme Court asking for help. Green and Douglas forwarded the letters to the Under Secretary of War who ordered an investigation of the general’s alleged threats and of the charge that German women were “creating a feeling of utter insecurity among our soldiers by untrue charges of rape and that these tactics may be part of a plan by the Germans.”

Gen. S was reprimanded for actions deemed “indiscreet, intemperate, and lacking in good judgment.” The accused enlisted men escaped punishment, despite investigators' failure to uncover any evidence of false accusations. The Army's case against them was weak. Although the women involved did not consent to sex, by their passivity they failed, in the judge advocate's opinion, to “put the accused on notice” that they were committing sex crimes; on his advice, rape charges were withdrawn. The defendants were instead tried for fraternization and acquitted even of this lesser charge. In light of the ample legal evidence of fraternization, it is surprising that the accused soldiers were not convicted, but the dismissal of rape charges was common practice. Without proof of a violent struggle, sex crimes committed by American soldiers were often tried as fraternization cases.

Judging the crime of rape was complicated by the conditions of war. The legal argument that the accused soldiers might have been unaware that they were engaging in non-consensual sex was certainly self-serving, and Army judicial officials deplored the idea that a soldier upon entering a strange house with rifle in hand might believe he had “accomplished a seduction.” On the other hand, German women, although seldom saboteurs, were not simply victims of male aggression. Many of the women encountered
by American soldiers had supported and even benefited from the war, at least in its early stages. Their welfare depended on that of the German Army and the National Socialist state, and as the war progressed, they suffered as a result of German military defeats. Like the young soldiers who were their peers, German women often refused to continue fighting in the face of almost certain defeat. Instead they preferred to surrender to their conquerors, having been warned by Nazi propagandists to expect rape. xlvi

During the final weeks of war and the hungry times that followed, German women lived in a precarious state “between rape and prostitution,” in the words of historian Annemarie Tröger. xlvii Along this continuum were various grades of coercion and degrees of choice, along with considerable confusion. Many German women were not raped, nor did they prostitute themselves. Nevertheless, they performed personal services for American soldiers. Some women took in laundry; others worked for American military units. These various relationships provided the women with advantages, namely access to American rations and to cigarettes and candy, the black market currency of postwar Germany. It might even have afforded them some protection, but it also opened them to sexual advances and sometimes to violence.

Women lucky enough to be employed by the U.S. Army did double duty as objects of desire. In Bremerhaven, for example, attractive German women replaced male waiters, adding cheer to the officers’ mess; it was a notable event for the bored soldiers who had little else to occupy themselves. xlviii During the same period of time in Oberliederbach, one enlisted man assigned to accompany a young German woman employed by his unit was unable to resist the temptation to fraternize. The driver, who witnessed the event, reported that Pfc. Clinton M put his arm around the shoulders of Anneliese H and kissed her; when the driver walked away from the jeep for a few minutes at Pfc. M’s request, the couple might have had sexual intercourse. Anneliese did not protest, but the extent of her active participation in this violation of Army policy is unclear. xlix We can speculate that with two soldiers in the jeep and her job on the line, she might have thought she had little choice but to cooperate with Clinton M, or at least tolerate his advances.
Although rape cases were relatively uncommon after the war’s end, the relationship between American soldiers and German women (who were the majority population of occupied towns) was fraught with potential violence. Lucia and Anna B, two sisters from Hainstadt, Germany, for example, cleaned up after the American soldiers billeted in the house where until recently the young women had lived. Anna and Lucia visited their former home several times a week in early summer 1945, and while there, in addition to scrubbing the floors, the two women ironed the men’s uniforms. Once, while Lucia was pressing a shirt, one of the officers tried to put his arms around her; when she refused his advances, he hit her on the back of the head in front of three American witnesses. Lucia’s sister reported the incident to another officer but did not pursue the matter further. A week or two later, the same man, Lt. H, with the help of two comrades, tried to rape another woman, Rosalinda G, who lived in the same town. Although a confidante of Anna and Lucia, Rosalinda had had less contact with American soldiers stationed in her hometown. She did laundry for a soldier named Sam, but he was not among the men who entered her house and assaulted her one night in mid-July.¹

These incidents might never have come to the Army’s attention. The women involved did not report the abuse to local officials, because they feared, in Rosalinda’s words, “that the soldiers might avenge themselves, and that the whole town might suffer as a result.” Other members of the armored infantry company to which the assailants belonged were silenced by fear, as well as by loyalty. One very religious Pfc., Walter C, did not report what he knew of these events but wrote about them in a letter home to his wife. He learned of the assault on Rosalinda from another soldier who claimed to have heard her cries for help. “I would like to report these things to someone,” wrote Walter C, “but I would only be proven a liar and my life would be made a living HELL under their command . . . . “ Despite his wish to unburden himself, Walter was not happy when questioned by a representative of the inspector general division after his wife forwarded this letter to Gen. George C. Marshall. Along with the other members of his company, he helped conceal the crimes that so troubled him.¹⁰
That Walter C’s letter reached his wife was a result of the relaxation of censorship following the German surrender. Two weeks after VE Day, the Army announced that unit officers in Europe would no longer be required to read enlisted men’s mail. The fact that unit officers would not read his mail probably encouraged Walter C to give to vent to his feelings in a letter to his wife, but the private’s allegations opened him to charges of libel. The regulations that had kept news of the American crime wave in Germany from publication in U.S. newspapers were also eased after the Allied victory in Europe. But while American forces fought in the Pacific, news reports were still subject to oversight by Army press censors.

Censorship of both mail and press served several functions. Its primary purpose was to keep information of strategic or propaganda value out of the hands of the nation’s enemies; information on troop attitudes and individual behavior was an added benefit. For the purposes of this chapter, the most important aspect of wartime censorship was its role in domestic propaganda. By withholding information that might present the Allied war effort in a less-than-virtuous light, U.S. Army officials ensured that Americans on the homefront received a whitewashed version of World War II. Even after the fighting stopped, self-censorship on the part of soldiers and journalists softened the image of the American forces in Europe.

While American troops still fought Hitler’s army, news stories on GI misconduct in Germany were heavily censored. In winter 1945, the Army admitted that American soldiers had sold military supplies on the French black market and publicized the severe punishments administered to those involved. Combat troops, however, were immune from journalistic criticism. Press censors restricted publication of stories on the orgy of looting in Germany that was, by one journalists’ account, so virulent that a “bystander often wonders whether we are not fighting a war on [the] side and as [our] chief occupation waging [a] campaign [of] grand larceny on [a] colossal scale.” The same censored news story criticized soldiers for their harsh treatment of German prisoners and civilians, particularly women; the writer reported that he had been informed that rape cases were on the rise in early April 1945. This account was never published, but in May
1945, at the behest of Gen. Omar N. Bradley, it was circulated among the commanding officers of Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.’s Third U.S. Army. Bradley urged his subordinates to give the matter of American misconduct further attention and to use “whatever steps . . . necessary” to combat the problem. “Now that the fighting is over,” the memo concluded, “[misbehavior] may be one of our most importation questions, as it effects the reputation of our Army and the attitude of men when they go home.”

American civilians would eventually learn of the looting, black marketeering, and fraternizing in Germany, but rape remained a taboo subject. Under the topic of “sex crimes,” for example, the New York Times Index for 1945 listed only a few overseas stories; these included reports of rumored mass rapes by Soviet, French-Senegalese, and African-American soldiers in France and Germany and by Japanese troops in Manila but not the general increase in serious crimes by American soldiers overseas. Together, these stories suggested that rape was a crime committed by foreigners or by black men but not by white American soldiers.

This journalistic approach mirrored Army policy, which treated rape by American soldiers as a racial problem. Army statistics seemed to confirm racist preconceptions; African American soldiers in Europe were charged with rape at a rate disproportionate to their numbers. But as Petra Goedde has pointed out, such discrepancies derived in part from German awareness of American prejudices. Believing, like Rosalinda G, that they would receive little assistance from American authorities, German women underreported sexual assaults by white soldiers as compared to black.

Even news of lesser crimes was slow to appear in the American press. The majority of news stories about the criminal behavior of American soldiers in Europe were not published until spring 1946 or later, when most of the men who participated in the fighting had been replaced by new arrivals. Possibly this lag in reporting incidents of misconduct can be attributed to a reluctance to criticize the behavior of soldiers who had sacrificed years of their lives for the Allied war cause. In their 1947 exposé on the American occupation of Europe, former Stars and Stripes reporters Bud Hutton and
Andy Rooney (later of “Sixty Minutes” fame) criticized their journalistic colleagues for self-censorship, but Hutton and Rooney’s report is very similar to those published in the popular press at the same time. They attributed misconduct to “Occupation Joe,” rather than his fighting predecessor, “GI Joe.”

American soldiers were also responsible for civilian ignorance. While many servicemen freely admitted to theft, they were far more circumspect on the topic of sexual misconduct. Like fraternization, looting was a court-martial offense, but most soldiers seem to have felt little compunction about stealing watches from German prisoners, silverware from German homes, or shoes from German stores. In letters to family and friends, they freely admitted to having “liberated” valuable objects from their owners and often sent home portions of their spoils as “souvenirs.” Pfc., later Cpl., Cliff Hope, for example, suffered no qualms about mailing home a whole package full of mainly contraband articles from Germany but felt extremely guilty about his “burning desire to fraternize.”

For many American soldiers, sex was a far more troubling issue than theft. Certainly some men, disregarding censorship regulations and penalties, were unable to resist the temptation to brag about sexual adventures abroad. This letter from a married sergeant addressed to a friend, probably a fellow soldier, was excerpted in a bimonthly censorship report:

You should see my girl over here too, she sure is a honey. She is only 21 and she said she is sure she will like the U.S. when we are married and I take her back with me. As tho, after seeing these Nazis kill our boys off, I would be crazy enough to take her back with me even if I were not married. All the boys have German girls now and they sure are good. They will make good wives for the German boys after we leave them. They will be a lot smarter too.

Other men, like Walter C, felt obliged to confess misdeeds committed by members of their military unit. Most, however, wished to keep this knowledge from ever reaching their parents, siblings, and sweethearts—especially their mothers and wives. By having
sex with an enemy national, a serviceman might betray not only American war aims but also his mother’s moral teachings and his own marriage vows.

One division commander, Maj. Gen. Holmes E. Dager, attempted to harness soldiers’ fear of exposure in order to combat promiscuous sex. He ordered that a form letter be sent to the parents, siblings, or spouse of any soldier under his command who contracted a sexually transmitted disease. The letter read:

To: Mr. (Mrs., Miss) ___________________________  
(Address from Service Record)

1. I regret to inform you that your (Son, brother, husband) has been reported as having contracted a social disease. He is now under the care of U.S. Army surgeons who specialize in the treatment of such diseases and will receive the finest and most modern treatment available. . . .

2. Your (Son’s, brother’s, husband’s) Chaplain’s name is _______. He will be glad to hear from you if you care to write to him. . . .

Sincerely yours,

__________________________

Captain (Lt.), (Inf Cav Arty)  
11th Armored Division

This highly unpopular policy came to the attention of the Army inspector general division after outraged soldiers sent copies of the form letter to *The Stars and Stripes*. One anonymous serviceman complained: “I haven’t contacted any of the social diseases, nor do I intend to, “but . . . if I should happen to contact any such disease I certainly would not want my mother to know of it.” Another man charged that the policy would "ruin many homes" and "contribute to more wrecked health" by discouraging soldiers from reporting symptoms of infection. Col. Charles Cheever, of the judge advocate’s section, agreed with this serviceman's assessment, remarking that "nothing could be more calculated to result in the concealment of a venereal disease than the knowledge that this fact would be reported . . . to the soldiers' wife, mother, or sister." Gen. Dager's attempt to shame soldiers into good behavior was quickly halted.
Like individual soldiers, most military officials would have preferred to keep such matters quiet, but the sensational intertwined topics of widespread sexual misconduct and disease attracted a great deal of press coverage. During the period from early May until late July 1945, *The New York Times*, for example, published weekly stories on the failing fraternization ban; at points, the topic received daily coverage. Local newspapers and national magazines reported that large numbers of American soldiers flagrantly violated military law, enjoying friendly relations with attractive German women who “dressed... to charm,” wearing low-cut blouses and remarkably short skirts.

These news reports were disturbing to American civilians who had long received a sanitized version of war and were scandalized by glimpses of the misconduct and promiscuity rampant in Europe. A trickle of negative news stories about the nation’s soldiers appeared in the American press prior to VE Day, but stories of criminal soldiers were overshadowed by those emphasizing the servicemen’s ingenuity, integrity, and kindness to war victims (especially orphaned children). Few civilians were prepared for the postwar flood of bad press for American soldiers in Europe. Having learned to view these young men as virtuous liberators, civilians were pained to read about immoral behavior.

Wives, mothers, sisters, and sweethearts were particularly appalled by stories of promiscuity in postwar Europe. Some women sought to improve soldiers' behavior by appealing to conscience. Cpl. Cliff Hope recorded such a letter in his memoir. Indirectly addressing the topic of fraternization, his mother wrote:

“Now that the fighting part of the war is over,” she began, “I do not know what you’re doing or what your set up is. However it may be that you’ll have temptations to do things that under normal conditions would not interest you at all.” She advised me to let my conscience (which she knew was “keen as a razor’s edge”) guide me and “cut you loose from anything that is not manly, clean or morally straight.” . . . [S]he added, “God is walking right by your side. . . . Don’t go anywhere, do anything or say anything that would embarrass Him.”
Then, putting it all in the context of the here and now, she suggested that my exemplary behavior might “help another buddy go straight.” lxix

Hope did not reproduce his response, but he did include an excerpt from his diary: “Read beautiful letter from Mother warning me against some of the things I have been doing. I make no excuses. Someday all this shall pass.” Maternal admonitions contributed to the son’s guilty feelings about fraternizing but did not affect his behavior. Soon after Hope received this letter, he became involved in an intensely romantic but ultimately platonic relationship with a young German woman he met while on guard duty. lxx

In response to bad publicity and anxious letters, many soldiers wrote home to their wives and mothers, insisting that the problem of fraternization was overstated. “To say 100% of the G.I. are fraternizing is a down right dirty lie,” one serviceman wrote in late June 1945. “Take my word for it honey there is in reality very few doing that. Actually I only know of two or three cases in my company of 202 men.” lxxi Another young enlisted man took a different tack, conceding that many of the men in his unit fraternized with German women, he reassured his mother that he was “different from all the rest of the GI’s in Germany” and would strictly adhere to Army policy. lxxii

Certainly not all soldiers violated Army policy or indulged in adulterous affairs, but many servicemen, while away from the watchful eyes of family and hometown community, committed acts that they never would have considered under ordinary circumstances. There are no good statistics on the number of servicemen who fraternized with German women, but estimates from the summer of 1945 suggest that while in some units a small minority of the men were intimately acquainted with German civilians, in others, fraternization “was the rule rather than the exception.” lxxiii By August 1945, 62% of white enlisted men surveyed by Army social researchers believed that “most” or “almost all” American soldiers in Germany “had some friendly contact with German girls.” lxxiv Another measure of friendly contact was the rising rate of sexually transmitted diseases among American troops in Germany. Between 27 April and 25 May 1945, the number of
sexually transmitted diseases reported by American soldiers in Germany more than quadrupled, increasing from 197 cases per week to 957.\textsuperscript{lxv}

By June 1945, “shacking up” was common among soldiers stationed in Bremen, Germany, where representatives of the Army inspector general section found that roughly 80% of enlisted men admitted to violating the Army's non-fraternization policy once promised anonymity. Most of the men were former combat soldiers and assured their interviewers that they could be “trusted to treat the Germans as they should be treated, that is, not to become friendly with them.” For them, fraternization was simply a sexual and recreational activity, and they resented the Army ban for restricting their freedom. Some of the men believed that fraternizing with the Germans was wrong, but most did not consider such behavior criminal. They compared non-fraternization to the nation’s earlier attempt to prohibit the consumption of alcohol. Moreover, they argued that removing the fraternization ban would actually further American policy objectives. It would, some believed, increase the number of soldiers using of condoms and prophylactics and thus decrease the high rate of venereal disease among American troops.\textsuperscript{lxvi} Others asserted that relaxing the fraternization ban would assist soldiers in identifying Nazis; two men reported having discovered hidden guns and radios while shacking up with German women. Finally, critics of the ban argued that social (and even intimate) contact with Germans was the best way to re-educate them.\textsuperscript{lxvii}

Fraternization did not imply forgiveness. In spring 1945, most American soldiers agreed that Germans were collectively guilty and should suffer as a nation.\textsuperscript{lxviii} The fact that most of the rapes committed by American troops in Europe occurred in Germany and involved German women suggests a strong correlation between sex and vengeance.\textsuperscript{lxix} But even consensual sex might be tinged with a desire to punish. One Jewish serviceman, for example, fraternized with the goal of discrediting Nazi racial theories. His story was related in May 1945 by an admiring co-religionist: “My ambition was to sleep with some female Nazi and then tell her I’m Jewish,” he wrote. “I can’t do it but I met one boy who did it. He said the reaction was something worth seeing. She turned
pale and couldn’t speak.” In this case, the greatest pleasure derived from the sex act was the ability to humiliate.

Conquest was a more common motivation than vengeance. As one soldier told Army's social science researchers: “The best way to show these Germans who won the war is to sleep with their women.” In April 1945, one infantryman who acted on this impulse, bragged about his new circumstances in a letter that was probably addressed to a fellow soldier:

I’m living the life of reilly right now. I have a three room apt with a german woman 26 yrs old whose husband is in Russia. Its too good to last. . . . I’ve been getting all the beer I want. Last night I had a bottle of good scotch. This all reminds me of the last few days of the African campaign. The war can’t last much longer. I’m writing this laying in bed. My "housekeeper" is washing all my clothes. I’m wearing her husband’s pajamas and dressing gown. This is the life. These women sure are funny. All the boys have women and rooms. I’m afraid it won’t last long.

This serviceman derived pleasure not only from his luxurious accommodations but also from the fact that his female companion (who presumably played the role of both housekeeper and paramour) was the wife of an enemy combatant. Lying in the other man's bed and wearing his pajamas and dressing gown seemed to enhance this soldier's enjoyment of the sexual fruits of victory.

Despite this sexualized desire to dominate and punish German women and men, American soldiers tended, as a group, to absolve their particular girlfriends of responsibility for Nazi atrocities. Individual Germans encouraged this tendency by denying culpability and claiming ignorance of concentration camps. They represented themselves as victims and bystanders rather than as aggressors and appealed to their conquerors for kind treatment. Although such pleas were initially greeted with skepticism, over time, they proved effective in softening soldiers’ attitudes toward the generally submissive German population.
Whatever the motive, less than a month after the end of fighting in Europe, fraternization had become commonplace. In May 1945, military police attached to the 12th Army Group reported the arrest of one thousand men for that crime. This number was less than 0.1% of the men who served in that group, but arrests represented only a small proportion of the actual violations.\textsuperscript{lxxxvi} Some commanding officers preferred to handle such matters internally, perhaps fearing the loss of valuable personnel.\textsuperscript{lxxxvii} Other commanders did little to restrain their men, possibly believing, as Gen. George Patton had earlier commented on the topic of French brothels, that “it is futile to go against human nature.”\textsuperscript{lxxxviii} They simply advised, “Don’t get caught.”\textsuperscript{lxxxix}

Many soldiers were not especially worried about being arrested for fraternizing. They knew that officers and military police often turned a blind eye to fraternizing couples,\textsuperscript{xc} and some men simply did not care if they were caught. In fact, prohibition seems to have added spice to some relationships; sneaking around was part of the fun. Even straight-laced combat engineer Henry Giles, who was faithfully devoted to his fiancée and future wife, Janice Holt, seemed to derive vicarious enjoyment from the antics of a fellow soldier: “One of the boys is shacked up with a girl right here in the hotel,” Giles wrote in his diary on 24 June 1945. “He calls her his little Nazi. With Lieut. Hayes on the prowl, they have to be careful. When they hear him coming she rolls out the back side of the bed & hides under it. Hayes hasn’t found her yet.”\textsuperscript{xci} Many American servicemen were caught with German women in their beds; the files of the European theater's judge advocate general contains several such cases. But for all the men caught, many more evaded detection or at least avoided punishment.

Sometimes overeager military police arrested a soldier whose behavior simply looked suspicious,\textsuperscript{xcii} but generally, the fraternization cases that went to trial concerned flagrant violations of the ban. Military police apprehended American servicemen and German women together in dark parks, brothels, German houses, and Army billets. In Offenbach on 21 June 1945, for example, two officers from the 1515 Quartermaster Battalion, while patrolling a park for fraternizers from their own battalion, discovered Pvt. Mark B of the
508th Parachute Infantry Regiment on a blanket behind his 3/4 ton weapons carrier and in the company of Lina K. The arresting officers observed Pvt. B zipping his pants as they questioned Frau K. Found guilty of fraternizing, Pvt. B was sentenced to six months’ confinement at hard labor and fined $90. After the sentencing, his defense counsel along with four court officers entered a plea for clemency. Pvt. B, they wrote, “had served the regiment well . . . , volunteering for and going on many extremely dangerous patrols.” Moreover, Frau K, who served as a witness for the prosecution, “was possibly prejudiced to the United States since she had lost both her husband and father during the war and may have been using the non-fraternization policy as a means of revenge.” Pvt. B’s prison sentence was suspended. Other cases included in the files of the European theater judge advocate general suggest that soldiers found guilty of fraternizing seldom served their full prison sentences.

In mid-July 1945, American and British occupation officials moved to relax the ban’s strictures. After July 14, American soldiers would be permitted to “to talk with adult Germans on the streets and in public places.” Other restrictions remained in place: American soldiers were prohibited from visiting German homes or marrying German citizens. Although justified as a response to the “rapid progress . . . made in carrying out Allied de-Nazification policies, this modification of occupation policy was an implicit admission of defeat. The fraternization ban, as contemporary critics pointed out, proved unenforceable. Men like Pvt. B brazenly disobeyed military law and received watered down punishments.

In the spirit of denazification, Stars and Stripes announced the policy shift as an opportunity for soldiers to communicate the disgust they felt upon learning of German concentration camps. However, it quickly became apparent that public conversation was in fact public courtship. American soldiers took immediate advantage of their newfound freedom to mingle and flirt with the German population. On the sunny afternoon of July 15, journalist Gladwin Hill reported that soldiers “sat on grassy river bank, chugged up and down stream in American boats and zipped around streets with the zest of a child diving into a box of candy previously accessible only by stealth.”
Although the title of this piece was “Few Fraternize as Ban Is Lifted,” Hill attributed the lack of intimacy more to German “resistance” than to American reluctance. A little more than a week later, *Stars and Stripes* reported:

> Every American newspaper from Maine to California carried pictures of you and you and you—if, first, you are in Germany and, second, if you spent a few hours with a fraulein. The dailies carry such captions as this: “Relaxation of Non-fraternization Wins Approval of GIs in Germany.” Pfc. Stephen Parks, of Amboy, N.J., and Cpl. Seymour Friedman, of Chicago, were pictured “Enjoying a Visit With a Rhine Maiden.”

*Stars and Stripes* published its own pictures of German-American flirtations and embraces in the weeks following the July 14 announcement. The Paris edition even printed a short item on the seductive power of German kisses.

The new visibility of fraternizing couples added fuel to public debates about the meaning of such behavior and who was to blame. No longer fearing that German women consorted with American soldiers for purposes of sabotage, American observers worried that they embraced their conquerors far too willingly, attributing this behavior to national socialism as well as to material needs. Syndicated columnist Ray Tucker, for example, asserted that fraternization was a result of Nazi policies that encouraged sexual “unmorality” and unmarried love. The sensational discovery of maternity homes established for unwed mothers of children fathered by German military officers seemed to support these allegations. But German lack of resistance was not the only problem; by mid-summer, it was apparent from press reports that American soldiers abroad were demonstrating considerable sexual initiative.

Once again, Wacs and cheating wives received more than their fair share of the blame. Opera singer Grace Moore, for example, charged that unfaithful wives and sweethearts had driven “disillusioned” servicemen into the waiting arms of German women. In the pages of *Stars and Stripes*, soldiers attacked civilians and servicewomen who criticized the fraternizers. Like Moore, they asserted that American women were the source of the
problem. Responding to a letter from a Wac who signed herself "Disgusted, and How!!!", one man rehashed the persistent rumor that Wacs scorned enlisted men's invitations. He concluded that the women were, thus, responsible for servicemen's misconduct:

   You talk about soldiers running around with German girls? And why not? We EM would rather go out with any American girl in preference with any two girls in Europe. But this is the way it stands. We see a Wac and say "hello," and what happens? She walks right by us as if we were dirt. cv

By this time, however, female misconduct was old news. As I have shown in earlier chapters, promiscuous women were the focus of public and private concern while the fighting continued. But soon after the Allied victory, fraternizing servicemen began to overshadow misbehaving women. If Germany had become, in the words of one worried mother, a "nation of prostitutes," cvi Americans proved to be willing johns. Although some would defend the servicemen’s right to behave as they liked, cvii many soldiers were deeply ashamed of their own excesses.

Sexual guilt became a major mental health problem among American troops preparing to leave postwar Europe. In the October 1947 issue of Mental Hygiene, two Army medical officers reported that 30% of neuropsychiatric and 50% of urology patients seen by doctors at the 121st General Hospital, in the port city of Bremen, Germany, suffered from "venereal-disease anxiety." The authors noted that colleagues at other facilities reported similar findings. Men diagnosed with this malady believed they had contracted sexually transmitted diseases and complained of physical symptoms, but the true source of their discomfort was psychological. Soldiers suffering venereal disease anxiety were commonly identified by repeated visits to the urology clinic even after receiving negative test results; they were then referred for psychiatric counseling. Scheduled for shipment to the United States after years away from home, they were unprepared to face family and friends—particularly their sweethearts, wives, and mothers. cviii
Exposure to nurses and female Red Cross workers played a major role in the treatment of venereal disease anxiety. Women’s condemnation was what these men feared. In the words of one sufferer, who required hospitalization after one extramarital incident, they felt “unfit to be in the room with an American girl.” In time and with the help of group sessions and recreational programs, this patient was able to return to his family, but even upon discharge from the hospital, he exhibited symptoms of sexual guilt. Another soldier who actually contracted a sexually transmitted disease remained convinced that he was diseased even after his gonorrhea was cured. Still suffering from shame and the belief that he had never completely recovered, this veteran continued to receive psychiatric counseling into the 1950s.

“Boys act differently over here. They are away from home; they forget everything,” one young serviceman confided to his doctors as he was admitted to an Army hospital for treatment of a sexually transmitted disease. Despite the dictates and punishments of conscience, American soldiers in Germany—many of whom had been virgins or faithful husbands prior to military induction—learned to regard sex as a commodity and a fruit of military conquest, rather than as an expression of married love. German-American relations were not wholly devoid of romance; some men did find enduring love and wed women they met over there. More commonly, servicemen formed temporary liaisons. In many cases, they planned to return to wives and sweethearts in the United States and hoped to hide their wartime affairs.

Fraternization confirmed many Americans' fear that by disrupting normal relations between men and women, the war had corrupted the nation's sexual morals. Before VE Day, women were more likely to be faulted, but the flood of stories about fraternizing soldiers that followed the end of fighting in Europe shifted concern away from female to male promiscuity. Published images of servicemen embracing the nation’s former enemies suggested betrayal and threatened the “disintegration of the American home,” in the words of Maine Representative Margaret Chase Smith.
Reconstituting fractured military families seemed the best solution to misconduct abroad. In a public letter to Henry L. Stimson, Smith urged the secretary of war to combat fraternization by permitting soldiers' wives and fiancées to join their husbands and sweethearts in Europe. Her proposal stuck a chord with many worried Americans; within a week of her announcement, she claimed to have received more than 200 supportive letters.\textsuperscript{cxvi}

In the summer of 1945, with combat still raging in the Pacific, such proposals were impracticable. But by the beginning of 1946, the U.S. government committed itself to shipping tens of thousands of American women and children to Europe.\textsuperscript{cxvii} By reuniting husbands and wives and encouraging soldiers to marry their American girlfriends, this policy sought to discourage fraternization, boost morale, and improve servicemen's morals. Creating American communities in Germany would, military planners hoped, also exert a domesticating influence on unmarried men; with the women's arrival, bachelors would have to guard their behavior or else "word concerning their improper associations could get back home." Although contemporary commentators probably overestimated this policy's ameliorating effects, it (along with an order prohibiting public displays of affection) helped quell civilian concern about unrestrained male sexuality and the erosion of American family life at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{cxviii}

\textsuperscript{1} For an introduction to the problem of dating the rise of the contemporary Arab and Islamic cultural paradigm, see Jay Spaulding, "The Chronology of Sudanese Arabic Genealogical Tradition," \textit{History in Africa} 27 (2000), 325-337, and the sources cited therein. For a critique of western scholarly handling of the issue, see Lidwien Kaptijn and Jay Spaulding, "The Orientalist Paradigm in the Historiography of the Late Precolonial Sudan," in Jay O'Brien and William Roseberry, eds., \textit{Golden Ages, Dark Ages: Imagining the Past in Anthropology and History} (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 139-151.


\textsuperscript{3} For a full discussion of the criteria by which most of these categories are constituted and detailed source references, see Jay Spaulding, "Individual and Communal Forms of Land Tenure on Echo Island, 1820-1901," \textit{Northeast African Studies}, new series, II (1995), 115-138. The present study adds the variable of religious distinction, meaning that at least one member held the title of \textit{khalifa} within the organizational structure of the Khatmiyya brotherhood to whom almost everyone on Echo Island belonged.
4 Jane Fishburne Collier, *Marriage and Inequality in Classless Societies*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. Collier's analysis was based in the first instance upon conditions in pre-state band or lineage-based societies, but to a significant extent the distinctions she observed, modified by various degrees and forms of government intervention, survived into the context of pre-modern state traditions such as that of the northern Sudan.


6 National Records Office, Khartoum (hereafter cited NRO), Miscellaneous 1/27/364, attributable to Group II. For the chronology of these earlier, undated documents from Echo Island, see Jay Spaulding, "The Old Shaiqi Language in Historical Perspective," *History in Africa* XVII (1990), 283-292. A similar logic may explain the three exceptional early but unrated bridewealth payments to be found in NRO Misc. 1/27/437(b) (Group I); 1/27/453 (Group II) and 1/27/369 (1249/1833-1834).

7 The recorded instances from Echo Island of marriage rated at 700 *ashraf* are: NRO Misc. 1/27/458 (Group I); 1/27/451 (Group I); 1/27/447 (Group II); 1/27/456 (Group III); 1/27/460(a) (Group III); 1/27/404 (1252/1836-1837); 1/27/384 (1256/1840-1841); 1/27/446 (1261/1845); 1/27/366 (1262/1845-1846); 1/27/409 (6 Jumada I 1267/9 March 1851); 1/27/362 (13 Rabi`I 1267/16 January 1851); 1/27/430 (12 Rabi`I 1269/24 December 1852); 1/27/373 (20 Rajab 1270/18 April 1854); 1/27/414 (10 Rabi`I 1279/5 September 1862); 1/27/389 (6 Sha`ban 1281/4 January 1865); 1/27/368 (7 Rabi`I 1282/31 July 1865).

8 NRO Misc. 1/27/412 (22 Ramadan 1263/3 September 1847).

9 NRO Misc. 1/27/368 (7 Rabi`I 1282/31 July 1865).

10 Spaulding, "Virginity," p. 83.


April 1866); M082 (1/27/454[7] [no date, but possibly 14 Dhu’l-Hijja 1282/30 April 1866]); M084
(1/27/368 [7 Rabi` I 1282/31 July 1865]); M087 (1/27/465 [27 Muharram 1286/9 May 1869]);
M088 (1/27/365 [22 Rajab 1287/18 October 1870]); M089 (1/27/361 [4 Sha`ban 1289/7 October
1872]); M093 and M094 (1/27/405 [2 Sha`ban 1287/18 October 1870]); M095 (1/27/419 [7
Jumada II 1300/15 April 1883]); M098 (1/27/433 [28 Muharram 1317/8 June 1899]). In one case,
a newly rich individual married another of his group: M040 (1/27/363 [20 Rajab 1270/18 April
1854]). The total number of status-symmetrical marriages after midcentury thus totals twenty-
five. Twenty-six marriages after midcentury were status-asymmetrical. One common pattern
was for old elite males to marry newly rich females. The first recorded instance was M038
(1/27/430 [12 Rabi` I 1269/24 December 1852]); others followed thick and fast: M043 (1/27/429[1]
1277/8 February 1861]); M056 (1/27/455[3] [12 Rabi` I 1278/17 September 1861]); M067
(1/27/426[4] [17 Muharram 1281/22 June 1865]); M070 (1/27/426[7] [13 Muharram 1282/8 June
1865]); M075 (1/27/444 [6 Rajab 1281/5 December 1864]); M078 (1/27/454[2] [1 Muharram
1282/27 May 1865]). Almost as common were marriages between old elite females and newly
rich males; the instances are: M039 (1/27/363 [20 Rajab 1270/18 April 1854]; M059 (1/27/455[6]
[10 Jumada I 1278/13 November 1861]); M061 (1/27/455[9] [truncated, no date; probably late
1282/27 May 1865]); M083 (1/27/454[8] [14 Dhu’l-Hijja 1282/30 April 1866]); M085 (1/27/465 [20
Muharram 1286/2 May 1869]); M086 (1/27/465 [22 Muharram 1286/4 May 1869]); M096
(1/27/422 [14 Ramadan 1292/14 October 1875]). It was by no means unknown after midcentury
for old elite males to marry women from outside the elite; the instances are: M045 (1/27/429[3] [2
M079 (1/27/454[3] [1 Muharram 1282/27 May 1865]); M097 (1/27/415 [8 Rabi` II 1308/21
November 1890]). In a few instances old elite females also married outside the elite: M058
(1/27/455[5] [14 Rabi` I 1278/19 September 1861]); M066 (1/27/426[3] [17 Muharram 1281/22
June 1864]). In one recorded instance a newly rich female married outside the elite: M050
(1/27/457[1] [4 Rabi` I 1277/20 September 1860]).

13 Attested instances of males marrying upward into the old elite before midcentury are: M006,
M007, M009, M017 and M021 (see note 11 above for sources). The instances recorded after
midcentury are: M039, M050, M058, M059, M061, M066, M071, M077, M083, M085, M086 and
M096 (see note 12 above for sources). When tested against other marriages before and after
midcentury, no difference bearing statistical significance may be discerned between the two
periods.

14 Before midcentury all attested instances of status-asymmetrical marriage involved upwardly-
mobile males; see above, note 13. The women who married up after midcentury may be found in
M038, M043, M044, M045, M053, M055, M056, M067, M070, M072, M075, M078, M079, M096
and M097; see above, note 12 for sources.

15 Spaulding, "Virginity," p. 83 (all values in riyals): case 1 (260) and case 23 (125).

16Ibid., p. 83 (all values in riyals). The instances in which men married up were: case 3 (258),
case 9 (1165), case 16 (130), case 18 (826), case 20 (865), case 24 (1140), case 28 (1020) and
case 35 (1085). The instances in which women married up were: case 4 (925), case 5 (215),
case 6 (337), case 10 (257), case 13 (258), case 14 (266), case 21 (1050), case 25 (1319), case
27 (3350) and case 29 (980).

17Ibid., p. 83 (all values in riyals); case 2 (300), case 7 (243), case 8 (1279), case 11 (1074),
case 12 (750), case 15 (550), case 19 (650), case 22 (1850), case 26 (5825), case 30 (1085),
case 31 (1035), case 32 (800), case 33 (1635) and case 34 (696).
Where newly rich married each other (cases 1 and 23) the average proportion of bridewealth comprised of jewelry and coin was five per cent. Where women married up (cases 4, 5, 6, 10, 13, 14, 21, 25, 27 and 29) the proportion rose to ten per cent. Where men married up (cases 3, 9, 16, 18, 20, 24, 28 and 35) the average proportion would initially read twenty-two per cent. However, if one excludes the extremely unusual situation in case 9, the average among the other cases would be only twelve per cent, a rate similar to what may be found among upwardly-mobile women. The average proportion of bridewealth in the form of jewelry and coin when marriages took place within the old elite (cases 2, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 22, 26, 31, 32, 33 and 34) was twenty per cent.

For the introduction of the cultivation of exotic breeds of date for export see Spaulding, "Land Tenure," pp. 126-128.

In only one recorded instance did a woman marry upward with halal; this is M096. In the other fourteen recorded instances, the upwardly-mobile woman brought no halal: M038, M043, M044, M045, M053, M055, M056, M067, M070, M072, M075, M078, M079 and M097. While this evidence is suggestive, it is not statistically significant. For sources see above, note 12.

The cases in which an upwardly-mobile man married with halal are: M009, M017, M021, M039, M059 and M085. The cases in which such an individual married without halal are: M006, M007, M050, M058, M066, M071, M077, M083 and M086. While this evidence is suggestive, it is not statistically significant. For sources see above, note 12.

Out of the forty early marriages, thirteen (33%) had a halal; M001, M009, M011, M014, M016, M017, M021, M022, M025, M030, M034, M036 and M039. Out of sixteen later marriages, seven (43%) had a halal; M085, M087, M088, M093, M095, M096 and M098. Out of forty-four marriages recorded during the 1860s only four (9%) had halal; M059, M060, M062 and M076. While this evidence is suggestive, it is not statistically significant. For sources see above, note 12.


For a discussion of the most fully-documented example from Echo Island, see Spaulding, *Heroic Age*, pp. 253-258. The document considered there is M025 (NRO Misc. 1/27/412 [22 Ramadan 1263/3 September 1847]).


Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces [SHAEF] "Policy on Relations Between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany" (12 September 1944), attachment to J. L. Tarr to Commanding General, Seventh Army and Commanding General, First French Army (27 September 1944), File: 250.1-2 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany (Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany); Dwight Eisenhower to Omar Bradley (17 September 1944), File: 250.1-1 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany; both in Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEF), National Archives at College Park, Maryland [NACP].

iv Leo Taub, History of Military Censorship in the European Theater of Operation, World War II, 1941-1945, Records of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.
v Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 1-10; Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 59, 97-99; William Phillips, Conduct of American Military Personnel in Germany (28 March 1944); Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker to Combined Section (18 May 1944); and James Clement Dunn to William Phillips (25 May 1944); all in File: 250.1-4 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany, Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP.

vi SHAEF, “Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany” (12 September 1944), attachment to J. L. Tarr to Commanding Generals Re: Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany (27 September 1944), File: 250.1-2 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany, Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP. See also Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 10-14; Goedde, “GIs and Germans,” 96.
vii SHAEF, “Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany” (12 September 1944), attachment to J. L. Tarr to Commanding Generals Re: Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany (27 September 1944), File: 250.1-2 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany, Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP.


xii The Stars and Stripes, London edition, 4, 6, 7 October 1944.


xiv Goodfriend recommended stricter enforcement and more convincing propaganda. Arthur Goodfriend to Chief of Special and Information Services, Report on Fraternization between Germans and American Officers and Men, File: 250.1-1 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany, Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944-1945, RG 33 (SHAEF), NACP. See also Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 142-4; Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 15 and Appendix 2.

xv Ibid.


xvii John E. Gordon to Chief Surgeon, ETO, Re: Educational Posters—Venereal Disease Control (31 August 1943), File: 726.1, Box 61, G1 Decimal File 1943-1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.


In his memoir, Louis E. Rosetti, later an avid fraternizer, recounted wartime rumors of a small boy who shot an American serviceman with his own gun and of "seemingly willing frauleins" who "lured [soldiers] into traps." *APO 451* (New York: Carlton Press, Inc., 1969), 115. Another man wrote, "What hurts though is the realization that the fraulein with the pretty smile is liable to stab you in the back and that the brat coming down the street...is liable to pull a luger out and shoot." Letter excerpted in *Censorship Survey & Morale Report—B.C.O. #7 (1-15 March 1945)*, File: Base Censor Office #7, Base Censor Office Correspondence, Military Intelligence Service, G-2, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan summed up the dilemma in his 14 March 1945 letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5: "...[I]t is paradoxical that the general tenor of our current legislation is that we who are advancing into Germany with the intent of punishing the Germans should, in cases of non-fraternisation, punish only our own people." This letter can be found in File: 250.1-2 Conduct of Allied Personnel in German, Box 12, G-1 Decimal File 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP.

Capt. J. A. Witt, for example, urged the Army to punish Germans as well as Americans. He argued that this policy was only fair, because fraternization was primarily the fault of German civilians who "attempt[ed] to induce the soldiers into conversation and into their homes." They tempted the soldiers with smiles and bottles of schnapps. A later letter from Pvt. Marvin E. Kelso suggested that German women were deliberately trying to "cause trouble in our Army." Witt and Kelso to *The Stars and Stripes*, Paris edition (2 May and 30 June 1945). Journalist Joseph S. Evans, Jr. recorded this suggestion he attributed to a soldier: "... in the case of sex, shoot the German girl, but do not punish the GI," in "Of Course they Fraternize—It's an Old Yankee Custom," *Newsweek* 25 (9 April 1945): 56-8.

The question of punishing Germans for fraternizing with American soldiers was introduced as early as 4 October 1944 by Robert A. McClure to SHAEF personnel and civil affairs divisions, Re: Non-fraternization with Germans, File: 250.1-1 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany, Box 12, G1 Decimal file 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP. Discussions continued into March 1945. See Goedde, "GIs and Germans," 137-9; Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans*, 67-9; Frederiksen, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 129.

On placing German towns off-limits to American troops, see Lt. Colonel E. C. Woodall to Colonel Brooks (26 March 1945), File: 250.1-2 Conduct of Allied Personnel in German, Box 12, G-1 Decimal File 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP.


*Censorship Summary and Morale Report, B.C.O. #7 (1-15 April 1945)*, File: Base Censor Office #7, Base Censor Office Correspondence, Military Intelligence Service, G-2, RG 338 [ETO], NACP.

One corporal from a tank battalion wrote: "Right now I'm on a pass and we get one week and I know a girl here she is German and she is nuts about me and I could get anything I want off of her, she sure is OK." Quoted in Maj. R. E. Lewis to Commanding General, Third US Army, Re: Violations of Non-Fraternization Policy (27 March 1945), File: 311.7, Box 18, G1 Decimal File, 1943-1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

A $65 fine was rumored to be the standardized punishment for fraternizing. In fact, punishments were often more severe. "Americans Ignore Army Ban on Fraternizing as 'They Feel Sorry' for Cologne Civilians," *The New York Times* (9 March 1945); "GI Fined, Jailed for Fraternization," *The Stars and Stripes*, Paris edition (27 February 1945).


On rates of sexually transmitted diseases among American troops in Germany, see Paul Padgett's article in Medical Department, United States Army, *Preventive Medicine in World War*.

33 Reactions to the Non-Fraternization Policy among Troops Doing Occupation Duties in Germany (April 1945), File: 250.1-1 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany, Box 12, G1 Decimal file 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEC), NACP.

33 Army teletype message #74168, from Ernest Leiser to Stars and Stripes (14 March 1945), file: 250.1-1 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany, Box 12, G1 Decimal file 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEC), NACP.

33 Earl Mazo, "Frauleins Bent on Sabotage are Crying Rape, Army Fears," The Stars and Stripes, Paris edition (19 May 1945). In a July 1945 article, Ernest Leiser suggests that the rape charges that he earlier reported were false; "65 Dollar Question," The Stars and Stripes Magazine 1, London edition (7 July 1945). See also Goedde, Gis and Germans, 85.

33 "Hello Sucker," Poster Warns Yanks of Getting Hooked on Rape Charge," The Stars and Stripes, Paris edition (12 June 1945) and Edward J. Hart, "The Order is Broken Every Hour," Sunday Express (3 June 1945), File: 250.1-10 Conduct of Allied Personnel in Germany, Box 12, G1 Decimal file 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEC), NACP.

33 The number of rape charges were still high in May but began to decline once the war had ended. Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 81-84; Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 220.

33 See judge advocate and provost marshal memos, exhibits C1-C4, attached to C. H. Bonesteel, Report of Investigation Concerning Brigadier General S. . . . (6 June 1945), unnumbered file, Box 18, Inspector General Inspection Reports 1943-1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

33 Paragraph 14b of the 1928 Manual for Courts-Martial defined rape as "unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman by force and without her consent. Any penetration, however slight, of a woman's genitals, is sufficient carnal knowledge, whether emission occurs or not. Mere verbal protestations and a pretense of resistance are not sufficient to show want of consent, and where a woman fails to take such measures to frustrate the execution of a man’s designs as she is able to, and are called for by circumstances, the inference may be drawn that she did, in fact, consent." Quoted in United States vs Pfc. Frank B. and Pfc. Samuel B. in untitled Inspector General investigation re: Rape of women by American soldiers, File: 70, Box 12, Inspector General Inspection Reports 1943-1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

33 It is unclear who reported the rapes. Untitled Inspector General investigation re: Rape of women by American soldiers, File: 70, Box 12; C. H. Bonesteel, Report of Investigation Concerning Brigadier General S. . . . (6 June 1945), unnumbered file, Box 18; both in Inspector General Inspection Reports 1943-1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP. 33 On rumors of false rape charges lodged by German women, see excerpts from censored letters in Censorship Report on General Morale of Troops for Period 1-15 May 1945 and Censorship Report on General Morale of Troops for Period 1-15 June 1945; both in File: 58 Censorship, Box 9, Historical Division Administrative Files, 1942-June 1946, RG 338 [ETO], NACP: Dave Burns to The Stars and Stripes (29 March 1945).


33 Untitled Inspector General investigation re: Rape of women by American soldiers, File: 70, Box 12; C. H. Bonesteel, Report of Investigation Concerning Brigadier General S. . . . (6 June 1945), unnumbered file, Box 18; both in Inspector General Inspection Reports 1943-1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP. See also Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 81-4; Saul K. Padover, Experiment in Germany (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), 297-8.

33 Joseph Starr reports that the Army received 1,301 rape complaints, tried 623 rape cases during this period, and convicted 297 American soldier of rape between January and July 1945. Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 81-2.

Seventh Army, Judge Advocate Section Reports, 1 December 1944-31 May 1945, quoted in Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 220.


Special Court-Martial Orders No. 16, 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (25 June 1945), File: M, Box 8, Judge Advocate General Case Files 1942-1945, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.


Ibid.

Ibid. and “Unit Censorship of EM’s Mail Discontinued in this Theater,” The Stars and Stripes, Paris edition (22 May 1945).


See, for example, Dana Adams Schmidt, "12,000 Troops AWOL in Paris; Thousands Join in Black Market,” The New York Times (26 January 1945).

This censored news article written by a reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch on 5 April 1945 was attached to a memo on the Misbehavior of Allied Troops by Omar N. Bradley (7 May 1945). See also Bradley’s 2 April 1945 memo on the same subject. Exhibits C-5 and C-6, attached to C. H. Bonesteel, Report of Investigation Concerning Brigadier General S. . . . (6 June 1945), unnumbered file, Box 18, Inspector General Inspection Reports 1943-1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

For example, of 77 rape cases reviewed by the Third U.S. Army’s judge advocate, 26 involved black soldiers. Untitled Inspector General investigation re: Rape of women by American soldiers, File: 70, Box 12, Inspector General Inspection Reports 1943-1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.


Excerpt from 6 June 1945 letter, in Censorship Report on General Morale of Troops for Period 16 to 30 June 1945, File: 212 Morale, Box 41, Historical Division Administrative Files, 1942-June 1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

The letter was to be individually addressed to the soldiers’ family. Form letter Re: Social Disease (29 May 1945), attachment to Col. Raymond Stone, Jr. to Commanding General, Third U.S. Army (19 June 1945), File: 726.1, Box 263, 12th Army Group AGO Decimal File, RG 331
(SHAEF); C. C. Park, *Investigation of Circumstances in Connection with Letter, 11th Armored Division*, Subject: "Social Disease (30 June 1945), File: Investigation #65-68 Jun 45, Box 6, Inspector General, Reports of Investigation, RG 338 (Third Army), both at NACP.

Ibid.

The *New York Times* published fraternization articles on 1, 6, 7, 10, 11, 15, 21, 27, and 28 May; 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, and 25 June; and 6, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, and 28 July 1945.


Some examples are: "$60 Fine for Fraternizing," and "Americans Ignore Army Ban on Fraternizing as 'They Feel Sorry' for Cologne Civilians, both in *The New York Times*, 27 February and 9 March 1945; Evans, "Of Course they Fraternize—," 56-8; "Charge Americans with Looting in Germany," *Christian Century* 62 (9 May 1945): 573.

George Gallup's surveys revealed a 19% divergence of opinion between American women and men on this question. Women overwhelmingly answered that men should not be allowed to date German women, although women under the age of 30 were slightly more emphatic than older women. By contrast, men were almost as likely to answer yes as to answer no. The poll also found that that “[f]amilies with a member in the armed forces in Germany are more opposed to fraternization than those with no member of the family in the occupation forces.” Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 513-4; “The Quarter’s Polls,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 9 (Autumn 1945): 385; “Women in the U.S. Favor Ban on Fraternization” *The Stars and Stripes*, Paris edition (15 July 1945); "Stay Away from Gretchen," *Newsweek* 26 (16 July 1945): 32.

Hope, *Growing up in the Wartime Army*, 199-200.

Ibid., 200-208.

Excerpt from letter dated 28 June 45, *Censorship Report on General Morale of Troops for Period 1 to 15 July 1945*, File: 212 Morale, Box 41, Historical Division Administrative Files, 1942-June 1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

Excerpt from letter dated 18 May 45, *Censorship Report on General Morale of Troops for Period 1-15 June 1945*, File: 58 Censorship, Box 9, Historical Division Administrative Files, 1942-June 1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

Table III, chapter 2, Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans in World War II*, 46.

The answer for the category "older German civilians" was considerably lower. Research Branch, Information and Education Services, Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, *Changes in Attitude of Soldiers in the European Theater Toward the Germans from April 1945 to August 1945* (September 1945), File: ETO-97, Box 1017, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, & Reserve), Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel 1942-1953, Entry 94, RG 330.


In one week, the group of 27,000 servicemen reported 82 cases of std's. If the men continued to contract std's at this rate, about 16% would become infected in the course of a year.


Ibid.

Tables 6 and 7, Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 82-3.


Research Branch, Information and Education Division, European Theater of Operations, Reactions to the Non-Fraternization Policy Among Troops Doing Occupation Duties in Germany (April 1945), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Surveys & Studies, Attitude Studies of Enlisted Men, ETO, Box 1340, Entry 31(ZI), RG 112, NACP.

Excerpt from 19 April 1945 letter in Censorship Report on General Morale of Troops for Period 16-30 May 1945, File: 212 Morale, Box 41, Historical Division Administrative Files, 1942-June 1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.


See, for example, one corporal’s letter from 21 July 1945: “We are allowed to talk to these Sauerkrauts now, but I don’t care to they are all a pain in the tank, they can sing the blues more than ten people and you don’t have to start talking to them they will come up to you and tell you all their trouble and how Hitler was no good. I don’t even pay attention to them I got enough troubles of my own.” Excerpted in Censorship Report on General Morale of Troops for Period 1-15 August 1945, File: 212 Morale, Box 41, Historical Division Administrative Files, 1942-June 1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

Research Staff Section, Information and Education, European Theater Service Forces, What the American Soldier in German Says about Germany and the Germans (November 1945), File: ETO-110, Box 1017, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, & Reserve), Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel 1942-1953, Entry 94, RG 330, NACP.


See, for example John Maginnis’ diary entry for 28 May 1945. He recorded a decision by his commanding officer to reprimand and retain two officers discovered attending a party with German women, instead of relieving them of duty with the military government detachment. Maginnis concluded this entry with the statement: “Already it was apparent that nonfraternization was going to be impossible to control.” John J. Maginnis, Military Government Journal, ed. Robert A. Hart (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1971), 250; Middleton, “Officers Oppose Fraternizing Ban.”

This October 1944 exchange concerned the issue of closing French brothels in areas occupied by American troops. Patton later publicly promoted fraternization between Germans and Americans, arguing that social contact would show the Germans “what great people we are.” Soon after that comment, Patton was removed as commander of the Third Army. Patton’s letter dated 19 October 1944 and Eisenhower’s 21 October 1944 response are attached to Maj. K. A. S. Morrice to Chief of Staff, Re: Instructions Relative to Closing French Houses of Prostitution (8 November 1944), in File: 726.1 Venereal Disease, Box 45, G1 Decimal File 1944-1945, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP. See also Chandler, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2238 and “Patton OKs Fratting—It Shows Germans How ‘Great We Are,” The Stars and Stripes, Paris edition (25 September 1945).

On 26 April 1945, one infantryman wrote: “As far as fraternization is concerned—you know there are strict rules ‘ag it. But the boys manage somehow—the attitude of most of the officers is that as long as fraternization is not seen (by the brass)—it’s ok. In other words, dont walk down the street with them. Anyhow, I’ve met some pretty nice pieces frauleins and polacks and Russians. Even knocked off a piece or two—cholk em up—one polack and one fraulein. . . “ Censorship Report on General Morale of Troops for Period 16-30 May 1945, File: 212 Morale, Box 41, Historical Division Administrative Files, 1942-June 1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

Command, Bremen, Germany (5 July 1945), File: 84, Box 8, Inspector General Inspection Reports 1943-1946, RG 338 (ETO), NACP.

xci In the same entry, Giles also described a lover’s quarrel between an Army captain and his German mistress. Henry Giles, The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles, ed. Janice Holt Giles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 370-71. See also Kahn, Betrayal, 98.

xcii See, for example, the case of Pfc. Harry H who was picked up by military police who saw him walking down the same street as two German women. They did not see or hear him converse with the women. Pfc. H was found not guilt of the charge. Trial of Pvt. Harry H., 346th Engineer General Service Regiment (20 June 1945), File: H, Box 6, Judge Advocate General Special Court Martial Case Files 1942-1945, RG 338 (ETO), NACP

xciii Case #453, 508th Parachute Infantry (28 June 1945), File B, Box 4, Judge Advocate General Special Court Martial Case Files 1942-1945, RG 338 (ETO), NACP

xciv See, for example, “Good (Looking) Germans,” 64; De Luce, “Fraternizing Code Honored in Breach,” 5; “You Just Can’t Gag a Man,” 42; Middleton, “Officers Oppose Fraternizing Ban,” 2; “Leave Your Helmet On,” 25. See also Goedde, GIs and Germans, 143-6.


civ “Shave Heads of Wives Untrue to GIs, Grace Moore Urges,” The Stars and Stripes, Paris edition (29 July 1945). The story was printed beneath photographs of a German woman embracing an American soldier and of American men and women at the Stork Club in New York City.


cvi “Mother of a Soldier in Germany,” to Time 46 (1 October 1945): 12.

cvii See, for example, Serviceman (name withheld) to Time 46 (12 November 1945): 6.

cviii Morris A. Wessel and Bernard D. Pinck, “Venereal-Disease Anxiety,” Mental Hygiene 31 (October 1947): 636-46. See also, Edward McDonagh, “The Discharged Serviceman and His
The Army's venereal disease prevention materials certainly fostered such emotions. Although promiscuous, diseased women usually decorated posters, images of innocent wives and loving mothers also played prominent roles in the Army's campaign to reduce infection by cultivating fear and shame. Printed materials encouraged sexual guilt by warning servicemen that they might infect their families, thereby blinding or deforming their yet unborn children. Medical Department, United States Army, Preventive Medicine in World War II, vol. 5, Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact or by Unknown Means (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1960), 233, 307.

Wessel and Pinck, "Venereal-Disease Anxiety," 636-46.


Wessel and Pinck, "Venereal-Disease Anxiety," 637.


Although there are no statistics on the number of men in Germany who violated their marriage vows, surveys of enlisted men conducted in postwar Italy show that married soldiers were less likely to engage in sexual intercourse than their unmarried peers. Still about 60% did, as did 75% of unmarried servicemen, no matter whether or not they had loyal sweethearts in the states. Research Branch, Information and Education Section, MTOUSA, VD Problems of White Enlisted Men in MTOUSA (10 September 1945) and VD Problems of Negro Enlisted Men in MTOUSA (25 September 1945), files: MTO-69 and MTO-70, Box 1030, Entry 94, RG 330, NACP.

Margaret Chase Smith to Henry L. Stimson, 29 May 1945, Statements and Speeches vol.3, p 414, and news articles in Scapbook vol. 32, pp. 107, 119, 121, 125, 129, all in Margaret Chase Smith Collection, Northwood University; "Army to Let Families Join Troops Overseas" and "Back Soldier-Wife Plan: Many Endorse Proposal that Women Go to Europe," New York Times (16 and 23 July 1945). Smith was not alone in her proposal to send American women to Germany, see Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 92 and 178 n. 203.

Ibid.
